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Article
Lessons in Cyclical Fiscal Activism
MIRIT EYAL-COHEN
This Article highlights an anomaly. It tells a story of two tax rules that
were introduced at the same time to achieve a similar goal. Both were
meant to be temporary and stimulate economic growth but received
dramatically different outcomes. The Article reviews the reasons for this
paradox. It demonstrates that the causes are structural, ideological, and
political. It argues that the historical support the two mechanisms received
diverged in accordance with their complexity, the perceptions they
epitomized, and their instrumental role in society. The Article not only
enriches an important and ongoing debate on the role of the tax system in
our society that has received much attention in recent years, but also
provides important historical insights to policymakers.
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Lessons in Cyclical Fiscal Activism
MIRIT EYAL-COIEN
I. INTRODUCTION
One thing about businessmen-they condition more readily than any
maze-running rats or the most impressionable of Pavlov's dogs. Give them
a reward for increasing their investment in new plant and equipment-the
7 percent investment credit-and watch them run for it. Threaten to take it
away, and watch them run even faster.
-Albert L. Kraus, N.Y. Times, 19691
In the last half-century, we have witnessed a massive expansion of
govermnent-provided incentives.2 The use of tax preferences produces
many advantages that increase the rate of return on cash flow from
investments.3 More recently, during reform debates, Representative Kevin
Brady (R-TX) declared that extending tax incentives for investments
would stimulate the economy and help close the "Growth Gap" between
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. S.J.D. University of
California, Los Angeles; L.L.B., LL.M, M.A. (History of the Americas) Tel-Aviv University. I thank
participants of the National Tax Association at Tampa, FL, the Law & Society conference at
Minneapolis, MN, the Southeastern Faculty Workshop at Florida State University, and the Tulane
University 2015 Tax Roundtable. I am also grateful to James Alm, William Andreen, Steve A. Bank,
James Bryce, Danshera Cords, Steven A. Dean, Shahar J. Dillbary, Heather Elliot, Kirsten Hickman,
Anthony C. Infanti, Calvin H. Johnson, Steve R. Johnson, Lily Kang, Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Ronald
Krotoszynski, Michael J. Madison, Gershon N. Mandelker, Susan C. Morse, Shu-Yi Oei, Peter B. Oh,
Sheldon Pollack, Diane M. Ring, Alex Raskolinkov, Mark B. Seidenfeld, Theodore Seto, Steven
Sheffrin, Kirk Stark, and Rhonda Wasserman. I am thankful to Stuart Coombs for his valuable research
assistance.
' Albert L. Kraus, Investment Tax Credit: Possible Suspension Sparks Advance in Spending on
Plant and Equipment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1969, at 61.
2 See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis
and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 561-62 (2008) (using tax expenditure analysis
to identify various tax subsidies and incentives in the international tax arena that should be significantly
modified or repealed); Tracy A. Kaye, Taxation and Development Incentives in the United States, 62
Am. J. CoMP. L. SupP. 617, 621 (2014) (comparing investment tax incentives in the United States and
European Union); KAREN DYNAN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., AN EVALUATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE
HOMEBUYER TAX INCENTIVES 2 (2013), http://www.brookings.edul-/media/research/files/papers/
2013/06/28-homebuyer-tax-incentives-dynan-gayer/28 homebuyer tax incentives dynangayer2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PMQ9-QS2Z] (examining the expansion of the various state and federal homebuyer
tax credits and deductions).
' It allows taxpayers to recover their costs faster, lower the effective tax rate, and reduce the net
cost of new investments. Theodore P. Seto, The Problem with Bonus Depreciation, 126 TAx NOTES
782, 784 (2010).
current and previous economic recoveries.4 "The bottom line," he avowed,
"is that faster growth in business investment generates faster private-sector
job growth."5 On the other hand, economic policy specialists continue to
assert that the merits of tax benefits for capital investment or job creation
are dubious.6
4 JOINT ECON. COMM., BONUS DEPRECIATION: CLOSING THE GROwTH GAP 1-4 (2014),
http://wwwjec.senate.gov/public/_cache/fliles/c83cbb43-402e-4a8b-ba36-2e2935b5e010/bonus-depreci
ation---closing-the-growth-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JTR-PXGK].
s Id at 1; see also Glenn Hubbard, As the Fed Moves, It Needs a Road Map, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2016, at A13 ("After the depths of the financial crisis, the government has depended too much on the
Fed to support economic activity. Fiscal policy could have reduced the cost of capital substantially
through greater investment incentives and business-tax cuts.. .. Economic growth is vital, but it can't
be achieved through monetary policy, certainly not by monetary policy alone."); Is It Fair to Tax
Capital Gains at Lower Rates than Earned Income?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2015, at R4 ("Investment
capital is one of the most important drivers of economic growth . . . ."); Robert J. Samuelson, No Tooth
Fairy on Taxes, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2015, at A17 ("The effect of tax policies on economic growth is
clearly important."); Andrew Lundeen, Permanently Extending Bonus Depreciation Grows the
Economy, TAX FOUND. BLOG (May 27, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/permanently-extending-
bonus-depreciation-grows-economy fhttps://perma.cc/H9LE-JQF3] (stating that in the absence of
comprehensive tax reform, the next best option to create jobs, increase wages, and grow the economy is
a permanent extension of bonus depreciation); William McBride, The Economic and Budgetary Effects
of Bonus Expensing, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/economic-and-
budgetary-effects-bonus-expensing [https://perma.cc/Y4YB-68SV] (finding that extending 50% bonus
expensing on a permanent basis would boost GDP by over 1%, the capital stock by over 3%, wages by
about 1%, and would create 212,000 jobs); MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX
PROVISIONS THAT EXPIRED IN 2014 ("TAX EXTENDERs") 2-3 (2015), http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R43898.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2SE-D2HP] (providing a broad overview of tax extenders).
But see Ashlea Ebeling, Depreciation Tax Extenders Big Bonus for Business Owners, FORBES (Dec.
18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2014/12/18/depreciation-tax-extenders-big-bonus
-for-business-owners/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160106022221/http://www.forbes.com/sites/ash
leaebeling/2014/12/18/depreciation-tax-extenders-big-bonus-for-business-owners] (asserting that
bonus depreciation has been around so long that it seems like a "business gimme"); John D. McKinnon,
House Committee Approves Permanent Depreciation Tax Break; Proposal Allowing Businesses to
Deduct 50% of Capital Purchases Up Front Heads to Full Senate, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-committee-approves-permanent-depreciation-tax-break-14013885
93 [http://web.archive.org/web/20150909092955/http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-committee-approv
es-permanent-depreciation-tax-break-1401388593]; Bill Smith, Small Business Advice: Hurry, These
Four Tax Breaks Expire at the End of the Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/small-business-advice-hurry-these-four-tax-brea
ks-expire-at-the-end-of-the-year/2013/11/25/a2fa85cO-5613-lle3-ba82-16ed03681809 story.html [http
s://perma.cclY29S-ST5V].
6 See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BONUS DEPRECIATION: ECONOMIC AND
BUDGETARY ISSUES 7 (2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads//assets/crs/R43432.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AV8T-M5ZS] (concluding that tax incentives such as the bonus depreciation "did
not appear to be very effective in providing short-term economic stimulus compared with
alternatives"); Thomas Gryta, AT&T, Verizon Tax Breaks Fail to Produce Jobs, Lower Bills Didn't
Lead to Increased Investment or Employment, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/at-t-verizon-tax-breaks-fail-to-produce-jobs-1418345589 [http://web.archive.org/web/20160
210002331/http://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-verizon-tax-breaks-fail-to-produce-jobs-1418345589)
("Meanwhile, the companies have kept their capital spending relatively flat since the stimulus was
adopted, and their employee count has dropped by more than 100,000 people, a fifth of their combined
work forces.... AT&T and Verizon appear to be using the benefit as intended, and both are plowing
876 CONNECTICUTLAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:873
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The immediate expensing rule is an example of a capital investment
incentive. Under this rule, taxpayers benefit from deducting the cost of
new purchases of capital assets instead of capitalizing it over their ordinary
useful life.' The benefit phases out, dollar for dollar, when a taxpayer's
cost surpasses a certain threshold.8 Enacted as a temporary measure in the
late 1950s, Congress has continually extended it to the present day. In fact,
in his most recent revenue proposals, President Obama suggested greatly
increasing and making this tax preference permanent.9
The immediate expensing rule is a tax preference that reflects a
historical path dependency.10 It is one of numerous tax benefits enacted in
1958 as part of far-reaching small business legislation in the hopes of
creating jobs and boosting economic growth." However, a closer look at
the immediate expensing rule reveals that its coverage does not correspond
to its content. De facto, the provision's language does not confine the
benefit to small firms. Nevertheless, this measure has been termed,
considered, and promoted as a small business tax benefit for political
reasons. In fact, although immediate expensing's label has remained
unchanged, in recent years its declared policy removed the focus on small
tens of billions of dollars into their networks."); see also CHUCK MARR & BRANDON DEBOT, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, HOUSE EFFORTS TO MAKE TAX "EXTENDERS" PERMANENT ARE ILL-
ADVISED 4 (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-7-14tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULY3-N384] (noting that
adding bonus depreciation to the extenders provisions would raise the cost to more than four-fifths of
the total "fiscal cliff' savings).
Under § 179 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), the dollar limitation on such immediate
expensing was $250,000 in the case of taxable years beginning after 2007 and before 2010, $500,000 in
the case of taxable years 2010-2014, and $25,000 in the case of taxable years beginning after 2014.
Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, H.R. 5771, 113th Cong. (2014).
' I.R.C. § 179(c) (2012); Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-29, § 127(aX]),
128 Stat. 4010, 4017.
I.R.C. § 179; see also DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 21 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/documents/general-explanations-fy2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CYG-RM
YT] (stating that the President laid out a framework for business tax proposing to increase that amount
to $500,000 and make immediate expensing permanent); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR
2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf [https://perma.ccIK66P-VTDJ] (proposing to expand and make
permanent § 179 expensing to allow businesses to expense up to $1 million of investment in equipment
in the first year); Kelly Phillips Erb, Obama Budget Proposal Tackles Small Business, Changes to IRS,
FORBES (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2015/02/03/obama-budget-prop
osal-tackles-small-business-changes-to-irs/ [https://perma.cc/KT8N-F9AR] (predicting that the budget
proposal would be an "easy win").
"o See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small Business the Chief Business of Congress?, 43 RUTGERS
L.J. 1, 55 (2012) (arguing that favoritism toward small businesses is entrenched in American society
due to our nation's philosophy of separation of powers and suspicions about the concentration of power
in large firms).
" See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics, and the
History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 6 (2008) (describing the conditions
that led to the enactment of small business favoritism in the 1950s).
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business, and generally declared its aim as stimulating investments for
businesses of all sizes. 12 The "small business" affiliation then remained in
the section's title for its ideological and rhetorical value.
A distant cousin of the immediate expensing rule, the late Investment
Tax Credit ("Investment Credit"), had a different experience. The
investment credit was enacted in 1962, suspended in 1966, restored in
1967, repealed in 1969, reinstated in 1971, increased in 1975, and
rescinded in the tax reform of 1986.13 The investment credit never
reappeared again despite numerous proposals put forth over the years to
reintroduce it. It was part of a cyclical fiscal activism trend that reached its
peak between the 1960s and 1980s.14 Although both measures were
enacted as temporary stimulus measures during the same period,
immediate expensing survived while the investment credit did not."
This Article starts by asking: What is the reason for these different
legislative treatments? The Article argues that the causes were
instrumental, ideological, and political. The two tax mechanisms received
different legislative action due to the distinct purposes they appeared to
serve. Politically, the immediate expensing rule enjoyed bipartisan support
throughout history because it was promoted as a small business preference,
whereas the investment credit was considered a tax break granted to
already profitable businesses to help lower their tax bills. It played an
important role during the turbulence of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
when the dramatic decline in social capital, trust in government, and
taxpayer morale first began.' 6 In this David and Goliath matchup, the
immediate expensing rule persisted while the investment credit was
knocked down.
However, this metaphor does not fully explain the oddity of the two
tax rules' histories. This Article identifies two other explanations for the
12 GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SECTION 179 AND BONUS DEPRECIATION
EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS, AND
ECONOMIC EFFECTS 1 (2015), http://usbudgetalert.com/Section%20179%2Oand%2OBonus%2ODeprec
iation%20Expensing/o20Allowances.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDK9-ENCD] (explaining that the
requirements governing the use of immediate expensing do not limit the size of the firm that can claim
such a benefit, but rather the maximum cost of the property acquired).
13 See infra Appendix fig.2 (charting the history and rate of the investment tax credit from 1962-
1986); see also Ajay K. Mehrotra & Joseph J. Thomdike, From Programmatic Reform to Social
Science Research: The National Tax Association and the Promise and Perils of Disciplinary
Encounters, 45 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 593, 619 (2011) (describing the public mood that preceded the
1986 tax reform act).
14 Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process
as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (describing the role of
the investment credit as part of the evolution of tax instrumentalism).
"s See infra Part ILI.A (tracing the history of the first time the government applied affirmative
fiscal actions in the hope of spurring economic growth).
6 See Ajay K. Mehrotra, Reviving Fiscal Citizenship, 113 MICH. L. REv. 943, 970 (2015)
(describing historic changes in taxpayers' notions of citizenship).
878 COAWECTICUTLAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:873
LESSONS IN CYCLICAL FISCAL ACTIVISM
anomaly. It focuses on ideological changes in tax policy and the emergence
of New Economics theory in the 1960s that put a growing focus on
economic stimulus.' 7 It also recognizes that the intricate nature of the tax
credit rendered it too difficult to comprehend and administer.' 8 The failure
of the investment credit was greatly attributed to its complexity, and to a
build-up of public disdain for cyclical legislation and fiscal activism.,9
New Economics theory emerged in the 1960s and prescribed increased
monetary, economic, and fiscal actions.20 It shifted the focus from a
passive tax policy to a more active fiscal agenda.2 1 With the support of the
Council of Economic Advisers, the government started utilizing the tax
system as an impetus of "functional economic calibration" to counter
economic cycles. 2 2
The investment credit symbolized a failed experiment in New
Economics theory and an unwanted government market intervention
through cyclical fiscal activism. 23 The demise of faith in the ability of
government to use tax measures to counter cyclical effects in the economy
" Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Tax Policy in the 1960s, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 477, 478 (1966).
18 See infra Part Ill.B (documenting that from its inception the investment credit attracted much
criticism).
19 Referring in this Article to the active use of tax measures to affect and manage the economic
market. See infra Part II; see also Shaviro, supra note 14, at 12 (describing the roots of cyclical
legislation in the 1961 Kennedy tax proposals).
20 See infra Part Ill.A (describing the radical objective of New Economics theory to influence
economic growth through federal spending and taxes); see also Shaviro, supra note 14, at 59
("[Glovemment can rely on a variety of fiscal illusions, or means of imposing costs indirectly and
otherwise camouflaging them in order to avoid public scrutiny. Examples include: increased with-
holding; inflation (the preferred method of the late 1960s and 1970s); deficit spending (the preferred
method of the 1980s); and taxes whose incidence is disguised or unclear (for example the corporate
income tax . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
21 See Mehrotra & Thorndike, supra note 13, at 594 (describing a similar economic emphasis that
took over the National Tax Association (NTA) agenda).
' See, e.g., Hearings on the President's 1967 Tax Proposals Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 90th Cong. 518-22 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on the President's 1967 Tax Proposals]
(statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, Brookings Institution) (providing
support for federal use of tax policy as an instrument to maintain economic stability); see also infra
Part III (describing critics' claims that economic forecasts were speculative and inaccurate due to time
lags).
23 See Shaviro, supra note 14, at 15 ("The Kennedy approach, however, today is recognized
as ... fundamentally flawed. A non-universal investment incentive (such as one that favors investments
in machines but not human capital, and that does not benefit companies, such as newly founded ones,
that have no tax liability to offset) tends to shift the allocation of investment, leading to reductions in its
profitability before tax, far more than to increase the amount of investment."); see also George E.
Zeitlin et al., Federal Income Taxation, 1967 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 717, 719 ("Late in 1966, when the
theory of the new economics was invoked to justify the temporary suspension of the originally
unpopular investment tax credit in order to restrain capital investment then considered to be straining
the balance of the economy, it again seemed successful, but there were ominous rumblings." (footnotes
omitted)).
2016] 879
led Congress to abandon the investment credit.2 4 Yet, the immediate
expensing rule has continued into the present, notwithstanding a lack of
clear evidence regarding its efficiency in stimulating new market
demand.25 The expensing rule benefited from small business path
dependency.26 This favoritism toward the "little guy" was reinforced
throughout history by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and small
business congressional committees that helped sustain other small business
preferences similar to the expensing rule.2 7
Once introduced, investment incentives tend to become entrenched in
our tax system and are politically difficult to retract.28 The debates during
the recent "fiscal cliff" demonstrated this truism. 29 Such maxims are
24 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, The New Economics ofAccelerated Depreciation, 23 B.C. L. REV.
1327, 1346-48 tbls.5, 6 (1982) (criticizing the effect of investment tax incentives and demonstrating
that the present value of investment incentives such as the investment tax credit produced a negative
effective tax rate); Daniel L. Simmons, Is It Really Reform? A Theoretical Overview of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, 1987 BYU L. REv. 151, 194 n.198 (The Reagan Plan [proposed to] repeal[] ACRS and the
investment tax credit and adopt[] a 'Capital Cost Recovery System' (CCRS) that utilized shorter
recovery periods than the Treasury Proposal.").
25 See supra notes 6, 12 and accompanying text.
26 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 3-4 (describing the process of small business path
dependency through the mechanism of the Small Business Investment Company).
2 See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the "Little Guy" Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L.
REv. 1041 passim (2013) (providing examples of the numerous small business preferences in U.S.
laws).
28 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1962: Hearing on H.R. 10650 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 87th
Cong. 2912 (1962) [hereinafter Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962] (statement of Paul D. Seghers,
President, Institute of U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income, Inc.) ("When you start a subsidy, it is hard to
stop it. We don't stop subsidies."); Ryan Alexander, 'Temporary' Tax Extenders Permanently Cost
Taxpayers Big, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic
-intelligence/2014/12/10/temporary-tax-extenders-sailing-through-congress-again [https://perma.cc/JF8
J-QQYU] (stating that tax extenders package contradicts fairness and honesty in tax policy); Len
Burman, The Politics and Policy of Tax Extenders, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/beltway/2014/12/01/the-politics-and-policy-of-tax-extenders [https://perma.cc/Y965-4EUR]
(referring to tax extenders as "'Tis the season for bad tax policy"); Victor Fleischer, Tax Extenders
(San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 14-159, 2014), http://ssm.conVabstract-2433167 [https://per
ma.cc/6UJ3-FD9P] (stating that extenders allow members of the tax-writing committees "to shape tax
policy in small, incremental ways, to raise campaign funds, and to quietly pay favors to well-connected
industries-all without unduly disrupting the . . . 'standing on principle' . . . that created gridlock in the
first place").
29 See, e.g., Richard Q. Lewis Ill, Are Tax Expenditures Reaching Their Goals? A View from the
Fiscal Cif[ FLA. B.J., Apr. 2013, at 28, 31 ("Using the tax code as a policy tool, the government has
sought, among other aspirations, to increase home ownership and college enrollment among low- and
middle-class taxpayers."); Conrad de Aenlle, For Small Businesses, Tax Law Has Become a Moving
Target, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/business/yourtaxes/for-small-
businesses-tax-law-has-become-a-moving-target.html?_r -0 [http://web.archive.org/web/2013021405
2230/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/business/yourtaxes/for-small-businesses-tax-law-has-becom
e-a-moving-target.html?_r=0] (describing how both § 179 deductions and bonus depreciation allow
expenses to be written off immediately rather than depreciate gradually); J.D. Harrison, How the
'Fiscal Clif' Deal Affects Entrepreneurs and Small Businesses, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/how-the-fiscal-cliff-deal-affects-entrepre
880 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:873
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particularly prominent in current tax reform proposals put torth to
significantly increase and permanently extena investment incentives sucn
as immediate expensing and bonus depreciation.30 These proposals
continue to ignite present debates in the media, contributing to some of the
largest tax expenditures in the U.S. budget. 3 1 The ability to write off
neurs-and-small-businesses/2013/01/02/27814a74-548d-lle2-8b9e-dd8773594efc story.htmi [https://p
erma.cc/5CQN-GXSB] (reporting Congress's attempts to appease small business by providing
extension of immediate expensing and bonus depreciation in order to provide a boost for small
employers planning to invest back into their firms in 2013); Don Lee & Jim Puzzanghera, 'Chf' Deal
Lifts Stocks and Doubts: Spending and Hiring Are Expected to Suffer over Uncertainties About the U.S.
Debt, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/02/business/la-fi-fiscal-cliff-
economy-20130103 [https://perma.cclN3LF-N2XX] (describing how bonus depreciation is aimed at
reversing the trend of decreased business spending on equipment).
3o DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR
2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 21 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/documents/
general-explanations-fy2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VA2-UVS9]; THE WHITE HOUSE & U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 16 (2012) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-201 2 .pdf, JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON
PRESENT LAW AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM SUBMITTED TO THE TAX REFORM WORKING GROUPS
285 (2013), https://www jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4517 [https://perma.cc/5XZU-
XAA5]; see also Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 22
(creating the initial bonus depreciation allowance of 30% in 26 U.S.C. § 168(k)). The allowance was
increased to 50% and extended as part of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 756. The bonus depreciation was extended in the Economic Stimulus Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 619, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 334, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat.
2559, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3304, and most recently the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
I13-295, 128 Stat. 4010.
" See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Tax Break Increases Deficit, but May Have a Silver Lining,
N.Y. TiMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/business/corporate-tax-break-on-
equipment-may-have-silver-lining.htmi [http://web.archive.org/web/20151105125427/http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/business/corporate-tax-break-on-equipment-may-have-silver-lining.html]
(describing the bonus depreciation as a tax subsidy); J.D. Harrison, Both Parties Want to Make
Business Tax Breaks Permanent. Here's Why They Won't, WASH. PoST (Feb. 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-small-business/wp/2015/02/24/both-parties-want-to-make-
small-business-tax-breaks-permanent-heres-why-they-wont/ [https://perma.cc/F7JF-GKS7] (describing
partisan controversy over extending business tax breaks and whether to offset the costs); John D.
McKinnon, House Committee Approves Permanent Depreciation Tax Break: Proposal Allowing
Businesses to Deduct 50% of Capital Purchases Up Front Heads to Full Senate, WALL ST. J. (May 29,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articies/house-committee-approves-permanent-depreciation-tax-break-
1401388593 [http://web.archive.org/web/20150909092955/http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-commit
tee-approves-permanent-depreciation-tax-break-1401388593] (describing Congressional uncertainty on
whether to permanently extend tax breaks); Maxwell Murphy & Emily Chasan, Clock Is Ticking on
Some Major Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/SB
10001424052702304470504579163663724949706 [http://web.archive.org/web/20150709001728/http:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SBI0001424052702304470504579163663724949706] (describing how
uncertainty over Congress extending temporary tax credits makes business forecasting more difficult
because of potential risks); William Perrey Pendley & Robert Elliot, The True 'Reagan Way' with the
Climate, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-true-reagan-
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investments is a valuable benefit for taxpayers-and costly to society.32
Scholars questioned whether the tax system should provide such incentives
and continue to extend them when there is little indication of their success
in stimulating growth.3 3  These discussions also considered non-tax
way-with-the-climate/2015/03/18/aabef8ec-cclc-lle4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html [https://perma.c
c/7VFP-H5EV] (highlighting two opposing views to George P. Shultz's commentary on President
Reagan's economic problem-solving approach); Laura Saunders, The Tax Mess Deepens, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203710704577054183310576476
[https://perma.cc/S7WQ-EK8F] (describing how to navigate the economic uncertainty caused by
political indecision on the fate of tax code); Bill Smith, Small Business Advice: Hurry, These Four Tax
Breaks Expire at the End of the Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/on-small-business/small-business-advice-hurry-these-four-tax-breaks-expire-at-the-end-of-the
-year/2013/1l/25/a2fa85cO-5613-11 e3-ba82-16ed03681809_story.htm [https://perma.cc/4YKN-
XY5B] (describing how economic pressure and political gridlock bode ill for tax provision extension
and the resulting challenge to business owners to plan accordingly); Tony Nitti, President Obama's
Plan for Corporate Tax Reform: A 'Grand Bargain' or Simply Another Name for an Old Proposal?,
FORBES (July 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.comi/sites/anthonynittil2013/07/30/president-obamas-plan-
for-corporate-tax-reform-a-grand-bargain-or-simply-another-name-for-an-old-proposal/ [http://web.ar
chive.org/web/201309111 5 5 3 5 6/http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/07/30/president-obama
s-plan-for-corporate-tax-reform-a-grand-bargain-or-simply-another-name-for-an-old-proposal]
(analyzing President Obama's plan to reduce corporate tax rates and use additional tax revenue to
create jobs for the middle class); Kyle Pomerleau, The Basics of Chairman Camp's Tax Reform Plan,
TAX POL'Y BLOG (Feb. 26, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/basics-chairman-camp-s-tax-reform-
plan [https://perma.cclW3CS-2CVH] (describing how Chairman Camp's plan to simplify the federal
tax code while maintaining revenue neutrality ignores and exacerbated tax code complexity).
32 See COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF H.R. 5771, at 4 (2014),
https://rules.house.gov/sites/republicans.rules.house.gov/files/1 13-2/PDF/I 3-HR5771 -SxS.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/JC9C-5K5G] (stating that according to the Joint Committee on Taxation, extending the
immediate expensing provision would reduce revenues by $1.434 billion over 2015-2024); Joseph
Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss
Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. REv. 15, 32 (1990) ("The liberal system of depreciation and investment tax
credit associated with certain assets helped reduce the share of the tax burden borne by the nation's
corporations from 23 percent to about 8 percent. Corporations undoubtedly factored favorable tax
consequences into marginal decisions on asset purchases."); id at 32 n.83 ("[Flavored assets have been
those assets eligible for depreciation or investment tax credit."); Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of
the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 9 n.27 (1988) ("[T]he combination of ACRS
depreciation and the investment tax credit (ITC) provided the taxpayer with total benefits that were,
even before taking into account the effects of leverage, more valuable than expensing for many types of
depreciable equipment.").
3 See, e.g., Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. AcCT. & ECON.
127, 148 (2010) (arguing certain provisions appear to have increased investment in some favored assets
but not aggregate investment); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX REv. 205, 212
(2012) (noting tax incentives encourage investment in capital at the expense of investment in labor);
Erik M. Jensen, Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating
the Alternatives, 57 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 5 n.27 (2012) ("[Certain provisions] created an extraordinary
incentive for investment in property that, were it not for the tax break, would make no economic
sense. .. [and] left 'cost recovery' for another universe."); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing GE and Other
Masters of the Universe, 132 TAX NOTES 175, 183-84 (2011) (pointing to the negative impact and the
bias of investment incentives on the effective corporate tax rate); Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for
Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REv. 493 (2007) (arguing that
accelerated depreciation is based on a questionable economic growth theory); Seto, supra note 3, at
782-83 (arguing investment tax incentives have the effect of creating "jobless recoveries" by shifting
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alternatives in the pursuit of the optimal form to incentivize behavior. 34
This Article seeks to shed new light on these discussions. It identifies
factors that not only enrich the debate on the use of the tax system to
influence taxpayers' behavior, but also provides policymakers with
historical insights.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the depiction of the
immediate expensing rule in legislative history as a small business measure
and the emergence of the investment credit. Part III describes the political
settings and unfolds the shift in tax ideology toward cyclical fiscal activism
under the New Economics theory. Part IV describes the experimentation
with calibrating fiscal policy represented by the use of the convoluted test
case of the investment credit. Part V concludes by providing insights
regarding the two narratives alongside the current debate over utilizing
investment tax incentives.
II. THE POLITICS OF SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
Immediate expensing is an extreme form of depreciation. It works to
recover the cost of the acquired property over shorter-than-usual recovery
periods, thereby providing taxpayers with the advantage of the time value
of money. 35 For example, as of 2010, taxpayers are permitted immediate
expensing of up to $500,000 of qualified property that cost up to $2
million. Accordingly, they can expense the cost of capital investments
until those total expenditures reach $2,500,000.37
businesses toward greater use of capital and less use of labor); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect
Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 245 (2009)
(claiming that investment incentives' uncertainty can spur investment). But see Michael J. Graetz &
Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the Challenges of
International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 347, 375 (2013) ("(Incentives foster] nations
choos[ing] to subsidize technological innovation because, in the absence of such subsidies, crucial
research and development would be underproduced."); Christopher L. House & Matthew D. Shapiro,
Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation, 98 AM. ECON.
REv. 737, 762-63 (2008) (holding that the expiration of temporary tax incentives accelerates the
subsidized activity); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REv. 567, 616 (2014)
("[A]n incentive-based approach would be to encourage industry participants to enhance their cyber
defense by ... allowing participants to ... [use] bonus depreciation. . . .").
34See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, The New Climate Metric: The Sustainable Corporation and Energy, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 383, 405 (2011) (pointing out the economic effect of investment incentives for
renewable energy equipment); Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REv. 797, 835 (2012) (discussing the delay in response to
certain tax incentives when designing a tax system comprised of sticks and carrots).
* GUENTHER, supra note 12, at 1.
36 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The following laws extended the immediate
expensing maximum limits to these levels: Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No.
111-147, § 201(a), 124 Stat. 71, 77 (2010); Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240,
§ 2021(a)d), 124 Stat. 2504, 2556-2558; Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and
Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 402(a)-(e), 737(bX3), 124 Stat. 3296, 3306, 3318;
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This Part tracks the historical roots of the immediate expensing rule
and the investment credit. It focuses on the role that small businesses
played in the enactment and persistence of the immediate expensing rule,
compared to other capital investment incentives that did not benefit from
such affiliation. Specifically, it points to political rhetoric used to portray
immediate expensing as a temporary and simple small business tax
preference. Expensing was meant to help small business retain internal
earnings for equipment replacement and expansion, while the investment
credit was viewed as a big business subsidy.
A. Recessions and the Obsolescence Gap
The concept of faster-than-normal depreciation, or rapid amortization,
appeared during times of crisis, primarily during World Wars I and I.38
The government began to offer "write-off certificates" as a way of
assisting companies that installed plants exclusively for wartime use. 9 At
that time, economists began to point out a major gap between the capital
recovery rules set by the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") and the actual
wear and tear of the property, especially in the first year the property was
placed in service, also known as the "obsolescence gap."Ao Many foreign
nations addressed the first-year obsolescence problem by providing
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 315(a)-(d), 126 Stat. 2313, 2330-31;
Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 127(a)-(d), 128 Stat. 4010,4017.
37 I.R.C. § 179(bXl)-(2) (2012). A taxpayer who purchased equipment for $650,000 could
expense $500,000 immediately during the first year in which the property was placed in service. In
addition, the taxpayer could utilize the bonus depreciation, which allowed taxpayers to deduct an
additional 50% of their cost of qualified property in the first year of service. I.R.C. § 168(k) (2012).
Thus, another $150,000 bonus depreciation expense transported the entire purchase to an immediate
write-off in lieu of recovering the cost of the equipment over its useful life. Assuming a 35% tax rate,
and that the taxpayer had a positive income this year against which he or she could take this immediate
deduction, the taxpayer could benefit from total tax savings of $227,500, and a net cost for the
equipment of $422,500, greatly lowering the effective tax rate on income derived from the investment
in this equipment. $650,000 x 35% = $227,500 tax savings results in $650,000 - $227,500 = $422,500
after-tax cost for the equipment. See generally THEODORE P. SETO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 265 (2012) (describing the emergence, history and projected fate
of the bonus depreciation expensing rule).
3 JOHN F. WITE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 148 (1985).
" With the end of World War 11, rapid depreciation was not restored until the Korean War broke
out in 1950, and even then was applied only to defense facilities. Overall, very few certificates of
necessity granting rapid write-offs have been issued. The Defense Production Act of 1940, ch. 508, § 6,
54 Stat. 712, 714, somewhat alleviated the situation by allowing a five-year write-off of war and
defense plants. See President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means on Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in His Message Transmitted to the
Congress, April 20, 1961, 87th Cong. 987 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 House Hearings] (statement of Joel
Barlow, Member, Taxation Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (describing the need to increase
depreciation allowances, and explaining that the United States lagged behind other countries).
4 Joel Barlow, The Role of the Investment Credit: The Gap to Be Filled if It Is Repealed, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION, at 649, 649 (1970).
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additional initial allowances of 10%-55%.41 Yet, under the Code, there
remained a need to provide evidence of additional technological
obsolescence to deviate from normal depreciation schedules.4 2 This was a
major competitive hurdle and a principal deficiency of the old depreciation
system. 43
Technological obsolescence was a direct consequence and a major part
of postwar industrial inefficiencies." With the rapid advance of industry
and the scientific-technical revolution of the 1940s, there was a growing
need to update and replace old machinery. 45 Studies indicated that the
modernization of U.S. industry was greatly needed at that time; American
industry was in the process of "produc[ing] modern weapons of the atomic
and space age with ineffective and obsolete tools."4 6 However, even when
new equipment was purchased, rapid wear and tear usually occurred in the
first year of its life.47
The U.S. economy saw a capital investment boom in the years
following World War 11.48 Rates of plant and equipment expenditures were
at their height.4 9 However, overproduction by large industrial firms and a
series of natural disasters resulted in the American economy entering a
41 Id. at 666.
42 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 989-90 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation
Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (explaining the need and difficulty of proving the cost of
technological obsolescence).
43 Id ("Although the [technological] obsolescence will inevitably take place in this first year, it
simply cannot be proved, but only predicted, at the time the facility is acquired.").
4 Good Stocks Still Belong in Balanced Program, 96 TR. & EST. 245, 245 (1957) (reporting from
the ABA Trust Conference on professionals complaining that "because of the too rapid obsolescence
factor caused by accelerated technological advances" some industries are inferior).
45 See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1546 (statement of Aerospace Industry
Association).
' Id at 1544 (statement of George E. Merryweather, President, American Machine Tool
Distributors' Association); see also Tax Problems of Small Business: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of
the Select Comm. on Small Bus., 82d Cong. 528 (1952) [hereinafter Tax Problems ofSmall Business]
(statement of Rep. Frances P. Bolton) (arguing for optional depreciation in place of prevailing tax
regulations on depreciation in order to maintain the nation's war readiness); Lowell E. Sachnoff,
Extraordinary Obsolescence, Rate-Making and the Atomic Reactor, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 269-70
(1958) (predicting extraordinary obsolescence in the atomic industry due to unanticipated technological
advances).
47 WITTE, supra note 38, at 146.
' See infra Appendix fig.3. Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shifted the burden
of proof of depreciation to the government, added clarification of criteria for application of the penalty
tax, and provided a minimum amount that would not be subject to the accumulated earnings tax. S.
REP. No. 83-1622, at 26, 68-72 (1954).
49 See infra Appendix fig.3 (showing a peak in business expenditures in new plant and equipment
of over $45 billion in 1958); see also Arthur F. Burns, The Current Business Recession, 31 J. Bus. 145,
145 (1958) (noting a "great burst of economic activity" following a short recession upon the conclusion
of hostilities in Korea).
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period of deep recession.so In 1957, industrial production severely
plummeted, prices on the New York Stock Exchange dropped, and
consumer prices rose to record levels." In 1958, the number of business
failures reached over 1,200 a month, the highest rate since 1933,52 and
unemployment reached 7.5%.53 Small businesses accounted for the
majority of the business failures around this time; 54 representatives of
small business appeared before congressional committees and presented a
gloomy picture of their affairs, attesting that they had had to borrow
funds in order to pay taxes, purchase equipment, and continue operations."
Financing the replacement of machinery and equipment turned out to
be a challenging task, especially for small businesses that relied on their
internal earnings.57 Professionals, scholars, and businesspersons urged the
Treasury Department to provide faster depreciation schedules; they saw the
solution to the obsolescence gap as permitting the recovery of the
' In 1955 and 1956, a series of natural disasters aggravated the economic condition of small
businesses. Hurricanes hit the Atlantic coast and heavy rains fell on the west coast, causing severe
floods and destruction. See generally Gordon E. Dunn et al., Hurricanes of 1955, 83 MONTHLY
WEATHER REv. 315, 315 (1955) (analyzing the 1955 hurricane season, which at the time was the "the
most disastrous in history").
51 See Table of Historical Inflation Rates by Month and Year (1914-2015 in %), US INFLATION
CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates [https://perma.c
c/48NF-CBVY] [hereinafter Table ofHistorical Inflation Rates]; see also G.L. Bach & Albert Ando,
The Redistributional Effects of Inflation, 39 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 10-11 (1957) (discussing the
redistributional effects of inflation in those years by comparing the performance of creditor and debtor
companies and shifts between each group).
52 See Richard Sutch, Business Incorporations and Failures-Numbers and Liabilities: 1857-
1998, HIST. STAT. U.S., http://hsus.cambridge.orgfHSUSWeb/toc/tableToc.do?id=Ch408-413 [https://p
erma.ccl5ZX4-2TLA] (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
5 Civilian Unemployment Rate, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/datal
UNRATE.txt [http://web.archive.org/web/20160414014932/http://research.stiouisfed.org/fred2/datal
UNRATE.txt] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
' Keeping the Records Straight, TIME, Aug. 20, 1956, at 84; Needed: Talent, Training & Tax
Cuts, TIME, Nov. 12, 1956, at 100 ("[T]he newest figures on small business are cause for some
alarm.").
" See Richard Sanzo, Small Business: Alive and Not Kicking, MGMT. REv., Dec. 1957, at 30, 30
("[I]s small business really thinking of cashing in its chips-or is it staking them hopefully on the
future?"); see generally Tax Slash for Smaller Firms Asked, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1956, at BI (detailing
conference featuring calls for increased availability of government contracts to small businesses); The
'Little Fellow', N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1957, at 97 (describing the reasons small businesses were
struggling and anticipating Congressional intervention).
' See Tax Problems of Small Business: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Small Bus., 85th
Cong. 617 (1958) (statement ofJ.W. Barfield, President, Barfield Instrument Corp.) (explaining small
businesses' inability to afford taxes after investing in equipment and expansion and noting the
difficulty for such businesses to obtain loans). For a survey of small business arguments, see Richard
Rutter, The 'Little Man' Keeps His Chin Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1958, at Fl.
" 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 987 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation
Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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investment in a shorter time.ss The Commerce Department identified two
main reasons for the post-World War II equipment-replacement problem:
the rise of inflation and the rapid rate of obsolescence with the advance of
technology. Consequently, it acted to revise depreciation policy and to
provide investment incentives to maintain the competitive position of the
United States relative to the rest of the world.60
The recessionary years of the late 1950s, and the financial
predicaments of that time, found Congress in a "mood" to help and
encourage small business,6 and augmented its sense of responsibility to
their well-being. 62  The introduction of massive small business tax
preferences in 1958 was a major part of Congress's plan for national
economic recovery.6 ' At that time, Congress viewed small business as an
important element in stimulating economic activity and creating jobs.
Therefore, Congress viewed helping small businesses as assisting the
recovery of the economy.' The next subpart depicts the creation of the
expensing rule as a route Congress took to address some of these issues.
' See generally Arthur H. Dean, Provision for Capital Exhaustion Under Changing Price Levels,
65 HARv. L. REv. 1339, 1346-48 (1952) (discussing concepts of equity in taxation of capital
exhaustion); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1124 (1954) ("It is often asserted that industry suppresses innovations which may
cause capital or inventory obsolescence."); Richard M. Rothschild, The Case for the Declining
Balance, 33 TAXES 502, 512 (1955) (emphasizing the significance of obsolescence as the most
important factor in depreciation).
5 See Machine-Tool Programs: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Select Comm. on Small Bus.,
84th Cong. 101-02 (1956) (statement of James C. Kelley, General Manager, American Machine Tool
Distributors' Association) (describing the problem of replacing obsolete equipment before recovering
its cost due to depreciation tax policy); Tax Problems of Small Business, supra note 46, at 529
(statement of Rep. Bolton) (blaming obsolescence in the machine-tool industry on tax regulations
requiring owners to predict when machinery will become obsolete).
' Cf 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1022 (statement of Benjamin A. Javits, President,
United Shareholders of America) ("In order to meet the economic challenge from the Communist
nations . . . the matter of tax depreciation on machinery and equipment is fundamental and vital and
needs thorough overhauling").
6" Eyal-Cohen, supra note 11, at 45.
62 For example, the government approved many expansions of the SBA loan program during the
1960s to address the tight credit problem of small firms. See, e.g., Small Business Agency Loan Ceiling
Increase Is Approved by House, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1962, at 3; Small Business Agency Loan Ceiling
Raised $250 Million by Senate, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1962, at 14; House Unit Votes to Raise SBA's
Ceiling on Loans, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1962, at 26. But see Small Business Agency Curbs Loans to
Firm; Cites Disaster Lending, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1964, at 3 (describing a decrease in SBA loan
funding for small firms in order to set aside funds for disaster lending).
63 STAFFS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION & THE TREASURY DEP'T,
84TH CONG., LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE UNINTENDED BENEFITS AND HARDSHIPS AND ADDITIONAL
PROBLEMS FOR THE TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL OF 1957, at 14 (Comm. Print 1956) [hereinafter
SUBSTANTIVE UNINTENDED BENEFITS].
64 See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 249-50 (1958) (statement of Sen. Fulbright) (identifying the success
of small businesses as a means of strengthening the national economy and proposing a bill to help
small businesses remain competitive with larger businesses).
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B. The Birth of the Immediate Expensing Rule
The abundance of small business favoritism is a result of politics. 65
The exalted status of small business as a bedrock of America protected the
expiration of temporary small business preferences such as immediate
expensing. Pursuant to public choice theory, over the years politicians have
been beholden to the interests of their constituents, 6 many of whom own,
operate, or work for a small business; and, indeed, there is some historical
evidence to this effect. 67 No politician wants to be seen attacking "Main
Streets across America"68 and taking money away from small businesses
that are regarded popularly as "the engine ofjob creation in this country." 69
Small business culture developed from our nation's philosophy of
separation of powers, one of the bases of our democracy. Throughout
history, suspicions about the concentration of power led the government to
favor small firms, viewing them as guardians of fair competition and free
society. 70 Natural disasters and economic shocks reinforced preconceived
notions that small businesses had to be salvaged whenever events out of
the government's control harmed their well-being.7 1 Over the years, the
s Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political Influence ofAmerican Small Business, 37
S. TEX. L. REv. 15, 32-33 (1996) (discussing the influence of small business organizations). See
generally Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10 (describing the politics behind small business favoritism).
' See Phillip Shabecoff, S.B.A. Under Fire: Program to Assist Minorities Discounted, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1971, at F3 (detailing the contention between representatives of districts with a large
African-American constituency and those with a mainly white constituency); see also Irwin L. Kellner,
A Bright Forecast for Small Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1984, at L120 (avowing the notion that
the business of our country is small business).
6 See Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political Influence ofAmerican Small Business,
37 S. TEX. L. REv. 15, 32-33 (1996) (discussing the influence of small business organizations); see also
Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10 (describing the politics behind small business favoritism).
' Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, LeMieux, Landrieu,
Senate Democrats Fight to Include Credit Relief for Small Businesses (July 22, 2010),
http://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?pPressReleases&ContentRecordid5bd6bbe9-fe6-428
2-be7d-df5b8b607a70 [https://perma.cc/3KKG-H55R] (statement of Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA)).
61 Id. (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)). But see Alex LaBeau, Be Wary of Political
'Small Business' Panderers, IDAHO PREss-TRBuNE (July 16, 2010), http://www.idahopress.com/
opinion/bestread/be-wary-of-political-small-business-panderers-take-poll-atlarticle-d5fa54d8-9068-11
df-9add-001cc4c002e0.html [http://web.archive.org/web/20160427205804/http://www.idahopress.com/
opinion/bestread/be-wary-of-political-small-business-panderers-take-poll-at/article d5fa54d8-9068-ll
df-9add-001cc4c002e0.html] ("In reality, the real cynical political motivation for touting 'small
business' is to create an 'us versus them' mentality that is not only a misrepresentation of reality, but a
dangerous path of rhetoric that leads to an economic caste system.").
70 See MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 11 (2d ed. 2003)
("[T]housands of small, personally owned and operated firms . . . formed the glue of America's
business system."); see also Frank T. Carlton, What Is Free Enterprise?, 3 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 655,
656 (1944) (discussing the importance of free enterprise to the American dream).
7' See Arthur F. Bums, The Current Business Recession, 31 J. Bus. 145, 145-46 (1958)
(explaining that a slowdown in production following an economic boom prompted by the end of the
Korean War led to businesses failing to meet their expected profits and sales during the second half of
1956 and into 1957); Needed: Talent, Training & Tax Cuts, TIME, Nov. 12, 1956, at 98 (detailing the
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government expanded its patronage and provided small firms with growing
special preferences through the legal system.72
The birth of the immediate expensing rule in 1958 is an example of
this path dependency. This rule was designed as part of comprehensive and
far-reaching tax incentives to encourage and foster small business. 73 The
new immediate expensing rule, titled "Additional First-Year Depreciation
Allowance for Small Business," permitted businesses, individuals, or
corporations that purchased depreciated property with a useful life of at
least six years to deduct up to a maximum of $2,000 during the first year
when such property was placed in service.74 Congress hoped this
mechanism would encourage additional investment in small business, since
it provided for a faster recovery of capital before taxing earnings."
Moreover, the immediate expensing rule increased desirable tax
simplification for small entities since it saved them the complexities of
depreciation calculation and recordkeeping each year by allowing small
businesses a one-time deduction when placing the asset in service.
During committee hearings on the topic of depreciation policies,
representatives from the machine tool industry, an apparent interest group
that benefits from any equipment purchase incentives, argued that
depreciation rates did not provide adequate allowances essential for
investments in new machinery by small businesses at that time.77 These
representatives supported small businesses by expressing concerns
regarding their ability to maintain modern equipment and compete with
decline in profits experienced by businesses in 1956 and the sentiment of economists that the success of
small companies is essential to prosperity). For example, a series of natural disasters in the 1950s
exacerbated the economic condition of small businesses. See Dunn et al., supra note 50, at 315.
72 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 55.
"One such incentive was the creation of the Small Business Corporation by way of the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 1361 (2012)); see also Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, § 101, 72
Stat. 689, 689 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 661 (2012)) (forming the Small Business
Investment Program).
1 See SELECT COMM. ON SMALL Bus., 85TH CONG., SMALL BUSrNESS TAx ADJUSTMENTS 29
(Comm. Print 1958). The benefit offered a $4,000 immediate deduction for an individual filing a joint
return. Under this rule, if the cost of the property exceeded $10,000, taxpayers were allowed a
maximum of 20% of $10,000. This special allowance was granted to taxpayers on top of the ordinary
depreciation permitted under the Code. Id. at 28-32.
" Id. at 29; SUBSTANTIVE UNINTENDED BENEFITS, supra note 63, at 6.
76 See, e.g., 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1554 (statement of Henry J. Griswold,
Chairman, Taxation Committee, Smaller Business Association of New England) ("[T]ax legislation
designed to assist small business must provide a realistic means of enabling smaller enterprises to retain
a larger proportion of before-tax earnings."); id at 991 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation
Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (emphasizing that smaller companies have more
difficulties with the current capital recovery ofmachinery).
7 General Revenue Revision: Hearing on Forty Topics Pertaining to the Gen. Revision of the
Internal Revenue Code Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83d Cong. 671 (1953).
2016] 889
larger firms.78 They further emphasized the crucial need to reduce
investment risk in small businesses, and to improve their credit condition
as a way of stimulating economic growth. One of their proposals was to
permit taxpayers greater flexibility in determining the length of the
depreciation period, and allow more rapid tax-free recovery on
investments.8 0
Soon after its enactment, it became clear that immediate expensing was
utilized by more than small businesses.8' Indeed, there was a politically
unified front of businessmen, professionals, and members of the media
across parties that supported the measure.82 The political value of the
"small business stock" was on the rise, and any proposal that benefited the
proverbial "small business" received wide bipartisan support.8 ' Big
business organizations concurrently began to push for the expansion of
immediate expensing by eliminating the limitation on the maximum
amount of the allowed immediate deduction." Clearly, foreign competition
was not the primary concern of small business at that time; rather, they
were worried about tight credit problems and national competitive
hurdles.85 Nonetheless, the Chamber of Commerce pushed for the
expansion of the small business immediate expensing rule in the name of
foreign competition. 86  The American Machine Tool Distributors
Association, whose constituents were poised to gain greatly from any type
of equipment investment incentive, also advocated for the increase in the
scope of immediate expensing. 87 They, too, called for a complete removal
" Id. at 667-68 (statement of I.D. McDonald, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tax Policy, National
Machine Tool Builders' Association).
" Id. at 670.
0 Id. at 672.
" See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM: COMPENDIUM
OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE 47-48 (Comm. Print 1959).
82 See, e.g., Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 3351 (statement of Raymond
Rogers, Professor of Banking, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University)
(stating that immediate tax payments reduce working capital and force smaller firms to borrow at high
rates).
8 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 11, at 33-34 (describing how Congress sought to avoid associating
small businesses with "rich men's tax," as well as other pro-small business rhetoric).
8 J. KEITH BUTTERS & JOHN LINTNER, EFFECTS OF FEDERAL TAXES ON GROWING ENTERPRISES
2-4 (1945).
8 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 21.
* See Revising Tax on Gains from Sales of Depreciable Personal Property: Hearings on H.R.
10491 & H.R. 10492 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th Cong. 33 (1960) [hereinafter
Revising Tax on Gains from Sales of Depreciable Personal Property] (statement of Joel Barlow,
Member, Taxation Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("[W]e have to get rid of our outmoded
depreciation and replacement practices in this country if we are going to modernize our plants and
reduce our costs so as to compete effectively with our foreign competitors.").
' See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1544-45 (statement of George E. Merryweather,
President, American Machine Tool Distributors' Association) (urging the committee to adopt the
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of the maximum limitation on the cost of the property allowed to be
expensed, as well as an increase in the amount to be expensed to assist
small businesses. 88
The small business lobby also advocated for immediate expensing and
the expansion of its scope. Small business owners praised the new
legislation and pleaded with the government to continue to provide them
with faster depreciation rules that left them with more internal investment
funds to purchase needed equipment and machinery. 8 9 Conversely, some
small business owners testified that, due to its dollar limitation, immediate
expensing had a restricted effect on encouraging their expansion. 90 Instead,
they advocated for a full write-off of all the costs of the asset during the
first year the asset was placed in service.91
During committee hearings, professionals and businessmen explained
that the retention of earnings by small business was crucial for the
purposes of reinvestment and expansion. 92 Because depreciation
deductions were spread over the useful life of the property, expansion
required additional cash, which made growth more dependent on the
business's borrowing power, rather than on its earnings. 93 Small
businesses, they emphasized, had an inferior position in borrowing due to
administration's tax credit proposal by amending I.R.C. § 179, while also recognizing that a complete
reform of the tax depreciation structure is also needed).
' See id. at 1545 ("In summary, we urge that the committee substitute a 30-percent initial
allowance deduction for the administration tax credit proposal, by amending section 179 of the code to
eliminate the $10,000 and the 6-year useful-life limitations, and by changing the initial allowance rate
from 20 percent to at least 30 percent.").
' See Revising Tax on Gains from Sales ofDepreciable Personal Property, supra note 86, at 147
(statement of Frank T. Powers, President, Powers Chemco Inc.) ("By reason of the adoption of section
179 my company and certain of its subsidiaries have already ben [sic] enabled to acquire badly needed
machine tools and other [immediate expensing] qualified property by tapping investment funds
otherwise not available to them.").
' See, e.g., Small Business Problems in Urban Areas: Hearings on H. Res. 13 Before the H.
Select Comm. on Small Bus., 89th Cong. 690-91 (1965) (statement of Al J. Braxton, CPA, Arthur
Andersen & Co.) (explaining that the investment credit is not enough for small businesses, despite
being a real incentive for expansion in larger businesses that have capital and financing).
" See Revising Tax on Gains from Sales of Depreciable Personal Property, supra note 86, at 16-
17 (statement of Fred C. Scribner, Jr, Under Secretary of the Treasury) (discussing the benefits of one-
year write-offs and "salvage value," using the hypothetical of a purchase of an automobile).
' See id. at 127 (statement of John A. Gosnell, General Counsel, National Small Businessmen's
Association) ("The small businessman is dealing with a fact of life, not an abstract theory, and if he is
not able to keep profits nor establish an adequate reserve, he is faced with an almost insurmountable
problem."); id. at 154-55 (statement of E.L. Lester, Jr., E.L. Lester & Co.) (explaining how no longer
appreciating the capital invested in depreciable property will burden small businesses by limiting the
amount of cash on hand at a given time); id. at 155 (statement of Hugh K. Marr, Accountant) ("H.R.
10491 would just be another tax law which, in many instances, could mean the difference in whether or
not a small businessman can afford to improve his efficiency by updating, adding to, or improving his
business property.").
" See id at 135 (statement of Edmund A. Spencer) ("[T]hose operating smaller businesses have
not the facilities that big corporations have to borrow money for capital improvements.").
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their inherent risk, which left them dependent primarily on internal funding
and retained earnings for any type of expansion. 9 4 Arguably, the tax
benefits simply "leveled the playing field" to account for the higher cost of
capital to fund small businesses.9 5
Scholars were some of the few skeptics who doubted the effectiveness
of the new expensing rule. They argued that while it may result in some
allocation of funds for small business growth, it was more likely to
postpone the timing of tax reckoning and to serve the machinery and
equipment production industry.96 Thus, if the tax benefit simply
accelerated the timing of purchases, rather than increasing the net amount
of purchases, it would not have much of an overall long-term stimulative
effect.9 7 If property was to be purchased every year, it would result in an
overall permanent postponement of tax on qualified property." The next
subpart describes the concurrent chain of events that eventually led to the
enactment of the investment credit.
C. Enactment ofthe Investment Tax Credit
As part of proposals in 1961 to stimulate economic growth and
improve the competitive position of the nation's industries, President
Kennedy and Treasury Secretary Dillon proposed a new investment
credit.99 On October 16, 1962, the government passed the Revenue Act of
1962, which added § 38 to the Code, providing a new credit of seven
percent of the property's cost with at least four years of useful life. 00 In the
same year, the Treasury Department also modified the treatment of
depreciation, liberalizing depreciable asset lives and the overall approach
to the determination of the depreciation deduction.' 0
' Id. (explaining that lack of credit is the reason for the disadvantage of small businesses over big
corporations).
" See id at 147 (statement of Frank T. Powers, President, Powers Chemco Inc.) (discussing the
inconsistencies involved in passing new laws after legislation was passed eighteen months prior as a
way to assist small businesses).
' See, e.g., L. Hart Wright & Jerome B. Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest
Enterprises: A New Look for Messrs. Small and Smaller Business, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1131, 1135, 1138
(1959) (discussing the ultimate effects of the amendment, including, but not limited to, maximizing
benefits when one purchases qualified property).
* See id. at 1135 ("[T]he provision will serve only to postpone the timing of tax reckoning.").
* See id. (explaining postponement as an effect of the § 179 amendment).
9 See H.R. Doc. No. 140, at 1-2 (1961) (presenting proposed changes to the House Ways and
Means Committee). This message was also reprinted with the committee hearings that took place three
weeks after the statement. See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 3.
"n The credit was limited to 100% of the tax liability up to $25,000, plus 25% of any tax liability
in excess of $25,000. 26 U.S.C. § 46(aX2), (c)(2) (1964).
.0. See Surrey, supra note 17, at 478 (describing this liberalization as a "companion" to the 1962
Act). The 1962 Act also aimed to serve as a substitute for the accelerated depreciation that had been
allowed during World War It and the Korean War, such as those found in 26 U.S.C. §§ 23(t), 124(a)
(1940).
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However, while retaining the view that the primary function of
depreciation is to measure net income over time, the Kennedy
administration had greater plans in mind for the investment credit. By
creating incentives for capital purchases that would not have otherwise
occurred, the 1962 Act intended to stimulate growth and create new
jobs.10 2 Senator Kerr (D-OK), who led the floor debates in the Senate for
the administration's tax program, characterized the investment credit as the
"most important single measure to strengthen and revitalize the American
economy enacted by the 87th Congress."' 0 3 Harvey E. Brazer, Director of
the Office of Tax Analysis at the Treasury Department, noted that the
administration's goal was to provide a more realistic revision of the
depreciation rules and to equalize U.S. business with its foreign
competitors in terms of the tax treatment of capital assets.1 0 4 At that time,
the United States fell behind the economic growth rate of other leading
rival economies such as the Soviet Union, Japan, and Western Europe,
which subsidized industrial investments.105
Several interest groups supported the enactment of the new tax credit.
The American Machine Tool Distributors' Association evidently gained
from any kind of equipment purchase incentive, more so when their
customers were established businesses with stable, positive tax liability to
offset against the investment credit. Their representative appeared before
the Ways and Means Committee, emphasizing the connection between
national defense and the need for an efficient and effective national
production base.' 06 When supporting the enactment of the investment
credit, the representative argued that the revenue loss from the tax credit
could be offset by the savings in cost production resulting from the new
machinery and equipment.' 07
Another lobbying group that was set to benefit from the enactment of
any type of investment incentive was the National Machine Tool Builders'
Association. However, this association believed that the proposed credit
was too complex and very limited in its application, due to its many
restrictions.' Instead, the association urged the committee to expand
immediate expensing by eliminating the rule's limitations and allowance
" Harvey E. Brazer, The 1962 Revision of Depreciation Guidelines, 15 TAX EXECUTIVE 7, 16
(1962) (explaining the benefits of the two provisions in Section 13 of the Act, as well as the proposed
seven percent investment tax credit).
103 108 CONG. REC. 18,734 (1962).
'n Brazer, supra note 102, at 16.
In See infra Part Ill.B.
" 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1544 (statement of George Merryweather, President,
American Machine Tool Distributors' Association).
'0 Id. at 1547 (statement of Everett Hicks, President, National Machine Tool Builders'
Association).
" Id at 1549.
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rate.109 Immediate expensing was described as a more effective and
equitable measure, compared to the investment credit."o The next Part
describes the emergence of the New Economics philosophy, during the
1960s, which was the driving force behind the birth of the investment
credit and attributed to its demise.
IHl. NEW ECONOMICS IN THE SERVICE OF FISCAL ACTIVISM
The first fifty years of the modern tax system witnessed tax policy
applied in a traditional manner, focusing on revenue-raising goals to assist
in the country's war efforts.' Until the Great Depression of the 1930s,
orthodox fiscal policy called for annual budget-balancing. During wartime,
tax policy was utilized to provide revenues to support the war efforts.112
When conflicts were over, wartime taxes were scaled back, but still left at
a high level.'1 3 After World War H, this policy was replaced by the concept
of the "stabilizing budget," a policy that maintained a tax structure that
would periodically be recalibrated to maintain a moderate surplus at high
employment, with reliance on certain "built-in stabilizers" and monetary
policy to combat ordinary recessions.114
At the end of the 1950s, the American economy was hampered by
recessions and shortages of working capital, compounded by high interest
rates and spiraling inflation." 5 In 1959, Congress initiated a wide-ranging
examination of the ways by which the income tax structure increased
inequities and the narrowing of the tax base.1 6 These concerns developed
into hearings held by the House Ways and Means Committee."'
"' Id. ("Unlike the proposed credit, an initial allowance provision can be both simple and
equitable in its application. A first step of this kind was adopted in this country in 1958 with the
enactment of a limited first year depreciation allowance as section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code.").
" See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the
Income Tax During World War II, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1989) (citing a twelve-fold increase in
federal budget expenditures from 1940 to 1945); see also W. Elliot Brownlee, Tax Regimes, National
Crisis, and State-Building, in FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE 1941-1995, at 93 (W. Elliot
Brownlee ed., 1996); Lawrence A. Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax that Wasn't: An Actual
History andan Alternate History, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 177 (2010) (describing changes in
tax policy that moved away from mass tax status).
112 STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., THE PRICE OF CONFLICT: WAR, TAXES, AND THE POLITICS OF FISCAL
CITzENsHIw 10 (2008); JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 117-18 (1985).
..3 Surrey, supra note 17, at 477.
.4 Changes in the money supply were used moderately to influence interest rates and yields on
corporate stock. GEORGE TERBORGH, THE NEW ECONOMICS 11-13 (1968).
"' See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 11, at 53 (positing that small business favoritism was made
possible by certain economic conditions and political elites).
"' Surrey, supra note 17, at 480.
... See generally 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39.
894 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:873
LESSONS IN CYCLICAL FISCAL ACTIVISM
The Kennedy administration assumed office in January 1961, in the
midst of a recession, and sought ways to stimulate the economy."' The
government embraced a new fiscal ideology by which it utilized the tax
system to direct taxpayers' behavior to achieve social goals." 9 Fiscal
policy was no longer aimed at budgetary balancing, but rather, a new era of
furthering social and economic goals was underway. Paramount among tax
measures was the Revenue Act of 1962, which added the investment credit
and made important changes based on the New Economics theory. 20 The
next subparts focus on the role the investment credit played in the
transformation of tax policy from revenue-raising to furthering societal
goals and economic stimulus. Eventually, this ambitious vocation turned
out to be yet another nail in the investment credit's coffin.
A. Compensatory Budget Policy
The economic decline of the early 1960s was still underway and was
expected to go further.' 2 ' The administration's response was almost
entirely to focus on the spending side of the budget, using executive orders
to speed up federal disbursements, such as accelerating procurement
"' See, e.g., January 1962 Economic Report of the President: Hearings Before the J Econ.
Comm., 87th Cong. 2 (1962) (statement of Dr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers) ("To provide stimulus and substance for the recovery, the administration early in 1961 took
four steps: (1) successfully sought the cooperation of Congress in enacting legislation to expand
purchasing power and create jobs; (2) accelerated Federal orders and payments on a wide front; (3)
pursued policies to ease money and credit; and (4) followed generally an expansionary budget
policy."); see also Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 1456 (statement of James 0.
Fogleman, Vice President and Secretary, League of Louisiana Savings & Loan Association)
(explaining the impact of the recession on the savings and loan industry in Louisiana); id at 1624
(statement of Hon. Harry Flood Byrd, Chairman, Senate Finance Committee) (explaining the economic
impact that the Revenue Act of 1962 might have on different industries); State of the Economy and
Policies for Full Employment: Hearings Before the J. Econ. Comm., 87th Cong. 115 (1962)
[hereinafter Hearings on Full Employment] (statement of Dr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman, Council of
Economic Advisers) (describing President Kennedy's policy and the public reaction to it); Kennedy
Readies Program to Curb Jobless Roll Rise, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1960, at 3 (announcing measures to
create additional jobs).
"' In addition, the administration's tax reform activity was not limited to revenue raising and the
elimination of tax preferences, but began to focus on other considerations, such as eliminating
unfairness. See SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: REVENUE WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
105 (1983) (asserting that this shift in tax policy was a result of the will of "elected officials to maintain
sufficient control over revenue and fiscal policy so as to be able to manipulate the economy and
government spending for their own electoral benefit"); see also JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 117-18, 154 (1985); Brownlee, supra note 111, at 93;
Jones, supra note 111, at 685-86 (highlighting that during World War II, the tax system underwent a
shift in tax burden from a few top individuals to an overall revenue machine).
" Surrey, supra note 17, at 477 ("Each year has found the Congress engaged in the consideration
of major tax legislation, and revenue measures of wide scope and important policy import have
resulted.").
121 TERBORGH,supra note 114, at 12.
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placements, highway fund allocations, tax refunds, etc.1 22 During the 1960s
the situation escalated. Unemployment reached an economic mark of 4%
growing to 7% in 1961, with a 1% inflation rate.' 23 At the time, economic
studies, such as that of Hall and Jorgenson, provided quantitative estimates
of the short- and long-term consequences of various tax policies on the
demand for investments in capital and equipment.1 24
President Kennedy decided to take things to the next level with New
Economics theory. Backed by the Council of Economic Advisors, he
proposed a new approach to put an end to the period of slow growth. 12 5
The President's Economic Report emphasized the need for the
development of tax policies that would supplement monetary policy in
assuring investment surplus.1 26 The report mentioned that this was intended
to be a step further in the art of fine-tuning.1 27 The administration
undertook a positive economic approach and acknowledged that a tax
provision, such as expanded outlays on machinery and equipment, might
be an efficient tool to achieve a particular stimulus objective.1 28 For the
first time, the government began to apply affirmative fiscal actions in the
hope of attaining economic growth.1 2 9 The administration's economic
policy viewed it as appropriate to respond to recurring cycles of recession
" See Surrey, supra note 17, at 481 ("The year 1961 marked the beginning of a concentrated
attack on our balance of payments problems, an attack that has continued ever since.").
2 See James Tobin, Stabilization Policy Ten Years After, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, no. 1, 1980, at 19, 58, 65; see also Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 1456
(statement of James 0. Fogleman, Vice President and Secretary, League of Louisiana Savings & Loan
Association) (explaining the likelihood of a major mortgage crisis); Hearings on Full Employment,
supra note 118, at 227 (statement of Rep. Curtis) ("I am afraid .. . [what you] call unemployment and
unused capacity is part of a natural process of dealing with obsolescence."); id. at 234 (statement of
Rep. Pechman) ("I am sure that when you have your hearings next February on the Economic Report
you will find that unemployment is no lower than it is today.").
124 Robert E. Hall & Dale W. Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 391, 392 (1967); see also Seymour E. Harris, Economic Fluctuations and Governmental
Performance in the Sixties, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1965) (indicating high levels of
unemployment, an average of 52% for the years 1958-1964, as compared with 1% in 1944 and an
average of 4% from 1947-1952).
'2 See EcoNomIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 4 (1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulecon
omicreports/1962.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD89-NCJE]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISERS 39-40 (1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.eduleconomicreports/1962.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/E3TE-5JQ3].
i" ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 125, at 17.
'n Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of
the J1 Econ. Comm., 89th Cong. 64 (1966) [hereinafter Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization]
(statement of Carl S. Shoup, Professor of Economics, Columbia University) (explaining the delicate
economic balance between a tax on consumption and a tax on investment).
`8 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 125, at 2.
i" Surrey, supra note 17, at 478.
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and recovery with expenditure increases as the weapon to end
downslides.130
However, the basic idea of the New Economics philosophy utilized by
the Kennedy administration was not new. The 1930s British economist
J.M. Keynes13 1 and his successors had long emphasized the need to control
economic activity through manipulation of the federal budget position. 13 2
Unlike neoclassical economics that promoted the idea of free markets
adjusted by an "invisible hand," 33 Keynesian economic theory called for
government intervention in the market to moderate cycles of economic
activity.134
What the New Economics theory added was the belief in the scope of
such control and the desire not just to balance but also to spur economic
growth by increasing federal spending and reducing taxes, or to restrict
" See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, Doc. No. 3222, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES 11 (1962) ("Although strong stimulation of the
economy by fiscal means seemed no longer necessary, it was important to avoid a degree of restraint
which might choke off the expansion needed to bring down unemployment and set the economy firmly
on the road to sustained growth.").
"' See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 199 (Atl. Publishers 2008) (1936) ("'To dig holes in the ground,' paid for out of savings, will
increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of useful goods and services. It is not
reasonable, however, that a sensible community should be content to remain dependent on such
fortuitous and often wasteful mitigations when once we understand the influences upon which effective
demand depends."); see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 101-20 (John
Cunningham Wood ed., 1994). But see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 37 (40th
anniversary ed. 2002) (criticizing Keynes' ideas and advocating for competitive capitalism for
economic and political freedom). See generally Howard S. Ellis, The State of the "New Economics", 39
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1949) ("The general conclusions to be drawn from a newly published
volume of essays on The New Economics seem to be that Keynes has influenced economic theory and
policy as has no one else, living or dead; that much of his influence is beneficial; but that much, if
indeed not most, of the theoretical innovations of the General Theory are acceptable only with
extensive reservation or unacceptable as descriptions of reality.").
132 See, e.g., Franco Modigliani, The Monetarist Controversy, or, Should We Forsake
Stabilization Policies?, in ESSENTIAL READINGS IN ECONOMICS 383 (Saul Estrin & Alan Marin eds.,
1995) (stating that the stock of money has a major role in determining output and prices); JR. Hicks,
Mr. Keynes and the "Classics;" A Suggested Interpretation, 5 ECONOMETRICA 147, 148 (1937)
(interpreting Keynes' theory as a "classical" theory); Abba P. Lerner, Functional Finance and the
Federal Debt, 10 Soc. RES. 38, 38-39 (1943) (describing a government fiscal policy that focuses on
the results of those actions on the economy); Abba P. Lerner, The Essential Properties of Interest and
Money, 66 Q.J. ECON. 172, 192 (1952) ("Because of the absence of an automatic achievement of a
satisfactory level of employment, monetary and fiscal measures must be harnessed to an employment
policy."); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387,
388 (1954) (explaining that government expenditure should be taken into account in economic
calculations).
"' See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: BooKs 1-111, at 157-66 (Andrew S.
Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1776) (describing market conditions of natural commodity price).
" KEYNES, supra note 131, at 295 (discussing various conditions of overconsumption and
underconsumption that balance between interest and money in the market).
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economic activity by doing the opposite.'35 The New Economics doctrine
called for utilizing fiscal,'36 monetary,1 3 7 and expenditure policies in a
flexible manner.138  The objective of New Economics was to make
appropriate changes on either or both sides of the federal budget using four
primary characteristics: 1) federal activism, 2) growth orientation, 3)
accurate forecasting, and 4) functional calibration.'
New Economics called for an active and flexible fiscal policy with a
budget position revised as often as necessary.1 4 0 The theory portrayed the
tax system as in need of occasional "functional calibration," and assumed
the correct position is the one that is correct for the given conditions, and
cannot be standardized over time.141 As opposed to other similar theories,
New Economics was centered on the ever-rising potential of the
economy.1 4 2 It focused on gap-closing and development, as well as on
utilizing statistical measures for the application of a growth-oriented
approach.1 4 3 For that purpose, the theory relied heavily on forecasting. The
135 Id; see also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 125, at 70 ("Federal
expenditures and taxes affect total employment and production by influencing the total volume of
spending for goods and services.").
" Increase in governmental expenditures was useful to stimulate the economy and decreased to
stop inflation. EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 125, at 214; see also SEYMOUR E.
HARRIS, THE ECONOMICS OF THE KENNEDY YEARS 88-97 (1964) (discussing federal expenditures as
part of the New Economics policy).
'" Monetary policy was used in a counter-cyclical manner by allowing greater credit in a lagged
economy and restricting borrowing during inflation. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note
125, at 85; see also Harris, supra note 124, at 1122-23 ("An important contribution to investment was
monetary expansion, a factor making for an excess of investment over saving-more money
contributes to reduced interest rates, and hence there will be more investment."); David Meiselman,
The New Economics and Monetary Policy, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 95, 95-97 (1967) (discussing the
effects of money and monetary policy on aggregate demand).
" Under this doctrine, in order to stimulate an economy, taxes can be reduced so as to spur
consumer spending. During inflation, an increase in taxes was sought to have the effect of reducing
spending. For a general overview of the "New Economics" doctrine, see Hearings on the President's
1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 22, at 518-24 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic
Studies, Brookings Institution).
' TERBORGH, supra note 114, at 8. In this book, George Terborgh, an economist at the
Machinery and Allied Products Institute and Council for Technological Advancement, describes the
essence of the New Economics theory from a critical point of view.
'1 Id. at 23; see also Alvin H. Hansen, Inflation and the New Economics, CHALLENGE, Nov./Dec.
1966, at 4, 6 (contending that monetary policy should always be relegated to the position of serving as
a "handmaiden to fiscal policy" and has the capacity of playing an enormously important role).
142 Walter W. Heller, Address at Committee on Economic Development Symposium: Adjusting
the "New Economics" to High-Pressure Prosperity (May 1966), reprinted in MANAGING A FULL
EMPLOYMENT ECONOMY 8, 9 (1966) ("[New Economics] is a commitment to an active, positive, and
continuous use of the instruments of modem economics to help keep demand at levels that will make
full use of the economy's potential--and keep that potential growing-without inflation.").
43 For example, since New Economics set as its goal the maintenance of economic activity at the
"full employment" level, it compiled a series of estimates of potential gross national product (GNP)
that would be created at a four percent unemployment rate from which it subtracted the actual GNP to
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annual budget began to incorporate an average forecasting lead of twelve
months.'" The incorporation of statistics and scientific calculations into
predictions allowed economists of the Council of Economic Advisors to
feel confident and optimistic about their ability to foresee market changes
and react accordingly.145
However, critics of the New Economics theory dismissed its
effectiveness as counteractive, or contracyclical, fiscal theory.' 46 They
believed the theory had several fundamental problems.' 47 At the outset,
economic forecasts were said to be speculative, inaccurate, and lengthy.1 48
There were three time lags involved in taking tax action: the time it takes
to interpret statistical and economic data and officially recognize and
acknowledge the need for action (recognition lag), which can further lag
for political reasons;1 49 the time required to obtain Congress's approval
after such recognition (legislative lag);so and once a tax measure is
enacted, there is a further lag in the response of the economy to that
derive the "GNP gap." It then utilized fiscal policy to eliminate that gap. TERBORGH, supra note 114, at
20.
144 Id. at 22 (arguing that because of the time lag between the initiation of such adjustments and
the realization of their economic effects, the adjustments must also be based on forecasts for shorter
periods than the regular budget).
i4 SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, J. ECON. COMM., 90TH CONG., 2 REVENUE SHARING AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: WHAT FUTURE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM? 1205, 1207-08 (Comm. Print 1967);
TERBORGH, supra note 114, at 22 ("Our statistical net is now spread wider and brings in its catch faster.
Forecasting has the benefit of not only more refined, computer-assisted methods, but of improved
surveys of consumer and investment intentions.").
" Harris, supra note 124, at 1128-29 ("On reasonable assumptions, I estimate that it costs
roughly from five to ten times as much to create a job through the deficit route (e.g., by tax cut) as
through the Manpower Training Act, that is, by training an unemployed worker for a new job."); see
also Richard D. Hobbet, Transitional Mechanisms to Facilitate Tax Reform, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 818, 821 (1969) ("The enactment of the rate reductions in the 1964 Revenue Act has been
characterized by Professor Surrey as a watershed in tax policy history, swinging the country over to the
'new economics."'); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., An Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique, 70 J.
MONETARY ECON. 19, 30 (1973) (arguing that econometric estimates are concerned with the timing
aspects of this form of fiscal action and that if the fiscal action is eventually accomplished, it is subject
to all of the lags and affecting tax changes believed to be permanent by taxpaying corporations).
11 Mortimer M. Caplin, Federal Tax Policy-The Need for Reform, 56 GEO. L.J. 880, 895 (1968)
("Recent developments, however, indicate less enthusiasm for this school of thought [New Economics]
when the call is for economic restraint and increased taxes."); Leo J. Raskind, The Federal Reserve
System: An Administrative Agency for Contemporary Monetary Policy?, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299,
313 (1967) ("Whether we are in a 'new era' or merely under the influence of the 'new economics' may
be open to some dispute.").
" TERBORGH, supra note 114, at 21-22, 97 (arguing that the average forecasting lead time is
twelve months, far beyond the effective range of the CEA and, even if the budget were enacted as
substantially as proposed, this long lead time would itself preclude any semblance of precise fiscal
action).
"' Id. at 96. For example, the Administration will be reluctant to admit to a recession until forced
by a period of consistent data.
'" Id at 106. One way to alleviate this lag is through presidential executive spending action.
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action.15 ' According to the Treasury, these time lags took between nine and
twelve months.152 The Commerce Department and National Industrial
Conference Board estimated an even longer lag.153 Assistant Treasury
Secretary Stanley Surrey was more pessimistic, professing that it takes two
to four quarters for any significant impact to take place,'5 4 while leading
economist Joseph Pechman anticipated a lag of six to twelve months
before changes in consumer spending are witnessed.' 5
Finally, critics such as economist Robert Lucas contended that once a
desired fiscal action is chosen, determining the magnitude of such action
was purely speculative and subject to various biases.1 5 6  The new
predictions were based on an assumption of permanency-which was not
the case of the investment credit.' 57 Lucas concluded that short-term
forecasting does not necessarily attest to the actual consequences of
alternative economic policies.158 It entailed assessing what would be the
course of the economy in the absence of fiscal action, by how much the
action should attempt to deflect it from its course, and what dosage is
needed to accomplish the change.1 59 Rather than being self-evident, the
' See id. at 98 ("The lag of demand is likely to be particularly marked in the case of business
taxpayers operating against long-term plans."); Meiselman, supra note 137, at 97 ("It turns out that,
after a lag, the change in the demand for credit swamps the change in the supply of credit stemming
from the initial increase in the money supply.").
152 113 CONG. REc. 6900 (1967) (statement of Rep. Bell) (stating that the Department of the
Treasury estimated the average order-to-completion period for equipment eligible for investment credit
as nine to twelve months, excluding buildings and structures, for which the period is much longer).
'" See NAT'L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., SURVEY OF CAPITAL APPROPRIATIONS 303 tbl.2 (1967);
Genevieve B. Wimsatt, Business Investment and Sales Expectations for 1967, SURV. CURRENT BUS.,
Mar. 1967, at 8, 9 (explaining that the average lag between new investment decisions and expenditures
spans several quarters).
'" See Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 127, at 238 (statement of Stanley S.
Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (claiming that the impact on the annual rate of GNP ranged
between $1-$2 billion per $1 billion of change in individual tax liability); see also J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27
VA. TAX REv. 437, 497 n.194 (2008) (noting Surrey considered an investment tax credit to be an
expensive tax expenditure); Bert G. Hickman, Diffusion, Acceleration, and Business Cycles, 49 AM.
ECON. REV. 535, 540 (1959) (discussing investment lags and expansion gaps).
" Hearings on the President's 1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 22, at 598 (statement of Joseph
A. Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, Brookings Institution); see also Tax Changes for Shortrun
Stabilization, supra note 127, at 10 (statement of E. Cary Brown, Professor of Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (stating that a low estimate of witnessing the effects on change
in consumer spending would be two quarters).
'" Lucas, supra note 146, at 20; see also Meiselman, supra note 137, at 100 ("My own judgment
is that much of the content of the more recent set of policy proposals which require more knowledge
than we possess-and aim to achieve ends of dubious merit-are no less erroneous than the New
Economics' first set of policy proposals which denied any important role at all to money.").
'" Lucas, supra note 146, at 30.
'nId. at 85.
'" TERBORGH, supra note 114, at 108.
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determination of dosage was said to be cloudy and uncertain.160 Yet,
despite its critics, New Economics enjoyed initial political support.16 1
Fending off critics of the New Economics theory, leading economist and
former chairman of the CEA Walter Heller noted:
[G]overnment action to stimulate supply and suppress
demand at certain pressure points in the economy might well
pass the test of economic efficiency. In pursuing these
questions and hypotheses, the economist will be laying a
firmer conceptual and empirical foundation for specifying the
areas and circumstances in which intervention may be the
lesser evil. 162
As the next subpart demonstrates, intense foreign competition and the need
for balance of payments were ripe political conditions for the New
Economics doctrine and the investment credit as its test case.
B. Foreign Competition and the Economic Race
During the 1960s, economic growth had become the primary objective
of the government for political and strategic reasons, arising from balance-
of-payments considerations and an "economic race" with the Soviet
Bloc.1 6 3 The U.S. government became concerned with its economic growth
rate, which had fallen behind the Soviet Union, Japan, and Western
Europe.1"' Many foreign nations were subsidizing investments and
allowing a more rapid cost recovery of new plants and equipment, in order
" See, e.g., id. at 184; Alfred G. Buehler, The Problem oflInflation, 326 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sc. 1, 7 (1959) ("We have not yet learned how to iron out the general fluctuations in the
economy which we call business cycles.").
161 See, e.g., J.B. Condliffe, The Guideline Economy, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 273 (1966)
("The new economics produced striking results as long as it was possible to mobilize reserves of
unemployed labor and unused industrial capacity."); Charles S. Overmiller, The Economic Outlook and
Tax Policy, 20 TAx ExEcuTIVE 213, 214 (1968) ("This impressive record of economic growth and the
concurrent use of a stimulative taxing and spending policy lend support to the argument that the 'new
economics' can be used effectively in moving the economy from a period of economic slack to full
utilization of its resources.").
162 Walter W. Heller, What's Right with Economics?, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 24 (1975).
163 See Abram Bergson, The Great Economic Race: U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R., CHALLENGE, Mar. 1963,
at 4, 4 ("There are many Cassandras who argue that unless the United States increases its growth rate
substantially, the Soviet Union will soon replace us as the world's first industrial power."); Diane M.
Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements and the Struggle to
Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, 154 (2000) (describing the
growing government concern in the 1960s of tax avoidance by U.S. corporations using transfer pricing
strategies with affiliates in low or no tax jurisdictions).
" See Solomon Fabricant, Interview, The Science and Art of Economic Growth, CHALLENGE,
Feb. 1961, at 22, 25 (acknowledging that "[p]eople have been worried about our relative position in the
world in respect to growth").
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to compete with other foreign industries.'i6  There was a growing consensus
in politics, industry, and academia on the necessity to provide the
equivalent of these foreign investment incentives to spur large-scale capital
investments. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce emphasized
that price and wage scales were not economically efficient compared to
those offered abroad.166 Scholars called for the lowering of the corporate
tax rate, claiming that higher tax burdens put U.S. firms at a disadvantage
for expansion and domestic production compared to their foreign
competitors.167
There was a general belief that the United States had been unable to
do a great deal with provisional and restricted incentives, such as the
immediate expensing rule, in ensuring the modernization and replacement
of productive facilities that were then greatly needed.1 68 Business leaders,
such as the President of General Electric, warned that capital formation and
economic growth in the United States during the 1950s were lower than
ever:
Adding urgency to this task of modernizing our
manufacturing plants is the newly-intensified challenge of
world competition. . . . But, Cold War aside, the realities of
competition in today's world markets demand that we
modernize those main aspects of public policy which affect
economic growth. In such a re-examination, tax reform must
come near the top of the agenda. 6 9
Professionals emphasized that compared to other nations, U.S.
industry suffered from inefficiency and a lack of modernized production
65 See, e.g., Richard N. Cooper, National Economic Policy in an Interdependent World Economy,
76 YALE L.J. 1273, 1287-88 (1967) (surveying the investment incentives granted by leading nations at
the time, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Japan, etc.).
i" See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 987 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation
Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (explaining that the United States has labor capacity but
that it is very costly compared to foreign countries that have more modem facilities).
67 See, e.g., Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 3089-90 (statement of Dan
Throop Smith, Professor of Economics, Harvard University) (advocating for providing American
business firms with lower domestic income tax rates in order to compete with foreign companies
abroad).
16 See, e.g., President's Proposal to Repeal Investment Tax Credit and to Extend Tax Surcharge
and Certain Excise Tax Rates: Public Hearing on H.R. 12290 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
91st Cong. 187-89 (1969) [hereinafter President's Proposal to Repeal Investment Tax Credit]
(statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (explaining
the various shortcomings of the current tax investment credit incentive); William F. Butler, Interview,
Problems in the US. Economy, CHALLENGE, Jan. 1962, at 20, 21 (examining U.S. economic growth
problems).
1" Gerald L. Phillippe, Taxes and Economic Growth, 14 TAX EXECUTIVE 302, 304-05 (1962).
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methods. 17 0 Many foreign plants were newer and more modern than their
U.S. counterparts, which put American industry in an inferior competitive
position and intensified the nation's balance-of-payments problem.' 7 1
These concerns played an important role in the government's decision
to inaugurate the investment credit.' 72 In 1962, Treasury Secretary C.
Douglas Dillon testified in favor of enacting the investment credit as a tool
to solve the balance-of-payments deficit, stating "[i]t is essential to our
competitive position in markets, both here, at home, and abroad, that
American industry be put on the same basis as foreign industry. Unless this
is done, increased imports and decreased exports will unnecessarily add to
the burden of our balance-of-payments deficit."' 73
Under the leadership of its Chairman, Walter Heller, the Council of
Economic Advisors (CEA) launched one of its most effective public
campaigns.1 74 In the following years, New Economics became a dominant
government philosophy of fiscal planning and action. Following the CEA's
recommendation, Congress enacted the investment credit in the hope of
encouraging equipment and machinery purchase through an increase in
their rate of return and cash flow from their investment.' 75 Yet, from its
"o See Martin Chancey, The Relative Decline of the United States Economy, 26 Sa. & SOC'Y 385,
387 (1962) (providing a comparative outlook on production in the United States and other industrial
countries); John W. Cook, The Investment Credit: Investment Incentive and Countercyclical Tool, 45
TAXES 227, 230 (1967) (positing investment in modem production facilities was one of the best
remedies to improve production rates).
"' See Butler, supra note 168, at 21 ("Even more important . . . is the need for more rapid
modernization of our plant and equipment.... To insure a vigorous and growing economy, we must
reduce the average age of our plant and equipment."); Cook, supra note 170, at 230 (explaining that the
lack of modernized production facilities contributed to inefficient production rates in the United
States).
72 See Cooper, supra note 165, at 1287-88 (detailing international tax incentive policies used to
encourage investment in new plants and equipment).
"13 Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 83 (statement of Douglas Dillon, Secretary
of the Treasury).
174 See, e.g., January 1961 Economic Report of the President and the Economic Situation and
Outlook: Hearings Before the J. Econ. Comm., 87th Cong. 310 (1961) (statement of Walter W. Heller,
Kermit Gordon, and James Tobin, Council of Economic Advisers); Arthur F. Burns, Professor,
Columbia University, Address Before the Business Economists Conference of the University of
Chicago: Examining the New "Stagnation" Theory (Apr. 21, 1961), in THE MORGAN GUARANTY
SURVEY, May 1961, at 4 (examining the impact of the Federal government's monetary policy on the
recession between 1958 and 1960); Council of Economic Advisors, The Council's View, in THE
MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, Aug. 1961, at 1 (comparing and contrasting Dr. Burns' analysis of the
economic factors impacting the economy between 1958 and 1960 with that of the Council's); Arthur F.
Bums, A Second Look at the Council's Economic Theory, in THE MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, Aug.
1961, at 6; see also Boris P. Pesek, Growth, Capacity Output, and the Output Gap, 45 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 294, 294 (1963) ("Last spring and summer we witnessed a vigorous exchange of views between
the present Council of Economic Advisors to the President and the former chairman of that body,
Professor Arthur F. Burns.").
.7. See January 1963 Economic Report of the President: Hearing on Sec. S(a) of Pub. Law 304
Before the J Econ. Comm., 88th Cong. 26 (1963) (statement of Walter W. Heller, Chairman, Council
of Economic Advisors) (describing a sharp decline in output from 1958 to 1962); Surrey, supra note
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inception, the investment credit attracted much criticism. The next Part
demonstrates that although the declared policy of the administration was
not to use the new credit as a cyclical device, but to make it permanent, 176
reality reflected the contrary. Businessmen were skeptical of the
administration's aversion to an on-again-off-again investment credit. 177
This cyclical instrumentalism eventually led to the demise of the
investment credit.
IV. CYCLICAL FIscAL ACTIVISM IN FORCE
A. The Business Community's Disapproval
In 1962, McGraw-Hill conducted a survey to predict future capital
expenditures as a result of utilizing the investment credit."' Businessmen
responded that it would only raise their capital expenditure by one
percent.1 7 9 Nine out of every ten companies that participated in the survey
replied they did not anticipate making any use of the tax credit. 80 That
same year, the National Industrial Conference Board conducted a similar
survey of the largest manufacturing corporations to determine the effect of
the tax credit upon capital investment trends. 181 Here, too, the survey
reported a rather small expected increase in capital outlay; in the majority
of the industries, the anticipated increase was under one percent.' 82 A
separate survey provided an even gloomier picture.' 8 ' The majority of
firms in that study indicated they did not expect the new tax credit to have
any influence on their capital investment decisions.18
17, at 477-78.
" See Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 2912 (statement of John L. Connolly,
Chairman, Federal Finance Committee, Council of State Chambers of Commerce) ("Well, it is intended
to be permanent, I am confident of that."); Cook, supra note 170, at 227 (holding both the accelerated
depreciation and the investment credit as instituted as permanent parts of the tax code).
"Kraus, supra note 1, at 61.
* See Supplemental and Minority Views of Sens. Paul Douglas & Albert Gore, 1962-3 C.B.
1092, 1100 (critiquing the benefit of providing investment credits on gross rather than marginal net
investments).
1' Id (amounting to $300 million in 1962).
... Nat'l Indus. Conference Bd., Special Survey on Pending Tax Litigation, Bus. REc., July 1962,
at 19.
182Id
'8 F.O. Woodard & Vincent M. Panichi, Investment Influences of the Tax Credit Program, 18
NAT'L TAX J. 272, 272-73, 275-76 (1965) (stating out of forty-two firms surveyed only four indicated
the credit exerted some influence over their decision); see also Capital Gains Tax Bills: Hearings on S.
2428, S. 2608, & S. 3065 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin.,
95th Cong. 64 (1978) (describing results of several other surveys similar to McGraw-Hill).
'" Woodard & Panichi, supra note 183, at 276 ("What effect will the 1964 amendment have on
investment? If the results of this present study can be considered valid, the answer is very little.").
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The temporary character of the new tax credit, and its declared purpose
of countering economic cycles, had businessmen up in arms. Business
executives remained apprehensive regarding the abundant uncertainty in
the President's declaration that "it may prove desirable for the Congress to
modify the credit from time to time so as to adapt it.",185 They sought
certainty. 186 The National Association of Manufacturers considered the
new credit as a device intended for the manipulation and control of the
U.S. economy. 87
Professionals, scholars, and the media described the investment credit
as "sugar coating,"'8 8 a "gimmick," 89 and an "outright gift" to its intended
beneficiaries.1 90 The Rubber Manufacturers Association labeled it an
"unwanted subsidy," arguing that it was a major departure from general tax
principles and an unjustified appropriation.191 The American Federation of
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations referred to the
investment credit as a "multibillion-dollar windfall that will not really
contribute anything to our national goals."' 9 2
The business community was in turmoil.1 93 In its recommendation to
the President, the Chamber of Commerce argued that the new tax credit
s H.R. Doc. No. 140, at 6 (1961).
in See, e.g., J.A. Livingston, Business Outlook . . .: Investment Tax Credit Just 'Another
Loophole', WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1962, at B9 (arguing for a simpler tax structure by citing the increasing
positions of prominence tax considerations now occupy in the course of business decisions); Lee
Silberman, Officials of 8 Big Accounting Firms Split Over Treatment of Investment Tax Credit, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 1962, at 32 (describing the even split amongst the members of the Accounting
Principles Board with regard to accounting for the tax rule); Utility Head Asks Rise in Tax Credit:
Action to Spur Investment Is Urged in Senate Inquiry, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 1962, at 26 (explaining
how the uncertainty about the tax credit has a depressing effect upon low margin business such as
hotels).
" 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1374-75 (statement of Charles R. Sligh, Jr., Executive
Vice President, National Association of Manufacturers).
"n Daniel C. Knickerbocker, Jr., The New Investment Tax Credit, PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1962, at 43,
43 ("The sugar coating on the President's 1961 tax proposals was the so-called 'investment
credit' ... . ).
18 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1023 (citing a Business Week article calling the
investment credit a gimmick).
'9 A.D.A. Asks Kennedy to Reject Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1962, at 22 (stating the bill will
not stimulate the economy and will cause a substantial decrease in tax revenue).
"' 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1550 (statement of Rubber Manufacturers
Association, Inc.).
'9 S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 348 (1962) (statement of Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Director of Research,
AFL-CIO).
193 See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 2905 (statement of John L. Connolly, Chairman,
Federal Finance Committee, Council of State Chambers of Commerce) ("As a tax reduction provision,
the investment credit is discriminatory."); J.A. Livingston, Business Outlook: No Great Loss ifTax Bill
Loses, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1962, at B8 ("The only excuse for the bill is the President's ardor for the
investment tax credit, based on the dubious speculation that it will speed the nation's industrial
growth."); Richard VanderVeld, Industry Cautious over Depreciation Move, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1962,
at C10 ("There seems to be a misunderstanding what this means in the eyes of many people. . . .
[F]aster credit in early years would be offset by higher taxes in later years after writeoffs had been
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was unfair and unreasonably discriminatory between taxpayers within the
business community in certain industries.1 94 Additionally, it claimed the
credit would not provide a sufficient stimulus to businesses that were in the
position of making large investments. 195 The Chamber's representative
argued that the new credit also discriminated against small and marginal
businesses because it applied only to firms with positive tax liability,
which the credit could offset." Instead, it proposed an overall
liberalization of the tax depreciation allowance system and immediate
expensing by eliminating the maximum limitation on the initial first-year
allowance altogether. 1
For similar reasons, the small-business lobby also expressed its
disapproval of the investment credit.'98 It considered the credit a
mechanism aimed at larger businesses that were already capable of
expansion.1 99 Small businessmen claimed that the new credit would not
encourage their expansion, especially because it initially applied only to
new property, which they could not often afford, compared to newly
acquired, used property.200 They argued that instead of enacting a new
apparatus, "[i]t would be far better to liberalize the treatment of
depreciation and work toward a general reduction in income tax rates.",201
In order for them to utilize the tax credit, they required strong borrowing
completed.").
" 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 992 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation
Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("The tax credit is unfairly discriminatory, because it gives
preferential tax treatment to one particular segment of the business community. . . . the segment that
happens to be in a position to make unusually large investments in 1961.").
' Id at 993 ("If there is to be a tax credit subsidy for investment in productive facilities, it seems
to me it should be given to all taxpayers in proportion to their investment in productive facilities.").
"n See id at 1033 (statement ofRev. William T. Hogan, S.J.) ("Marginal firms in large industries
will probably not get the full advantage of the plan and this is unfortunate for they need it most."); see
also Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 468 (statement of Walter A. Slowinski, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce) ("The credit gives preferential tax treatment to certain taxpayers in favored
groups. It may actually be a windfall to a business which had already fortuitously planned to purchase
new facilities later in 1962. On the other hand it will work against small businesses. . . .").
'" The Chamber of Commerce thought the new credit an insufficient stimulus to offset the effect
of the denial of capital gain treatment at a time of disposition of depreciable assets. 1961 House
Hearings, supra note 39, at 986 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation Committee of U.S.
Chamber of Commerce).
'- Id at 1553-54 (statement of Henry J. Griswold, Chairman, Tax Committee, Smaller Business
Association of New England).
.. Id at 1554.
2m Many small businesses purchased refurbished or used property. Id. Others that did not have
access to loans and outside funding used lease financing in order to obtain capital equipment. Id. at
1581 (statement of Alvin Zises, President, Bankers Leasing Corp.).
201 S. REp. No. 87-1881, at 349 (1962) (statement of Charles B. Shuman, President, American
Farm Bureau Federation).
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power and positive tax liability. 2 02 Businesses with losses or negative tax
liability could not utilize the investment credit, but could carry it forward
to a year where they incur a positive tax balance.203
Political organizations, such as Americans for Democratic Action-
one of the nation's oldest liberal groups204-also advocated against the new
tax credit and for expansion of immediate expensing.205 They urged the
Ways and Means Committee to commit to liberalizing the depreciation
system. 20 6  They acknowledged that tax incentives were needed to
encourage investors to assume risks, to develop new undertakings, and to
expand existing businesses.207 Although some regarded the investment
credit as nothing more than a temporary transitional measure,208 others
recognized that, once enacted, tax preferences are hard to discontinue. 2 09
Many considered the investment credit to be a big business tax break
because it was made available not only to individuals and ordinary
corporations, but also to large mutual savings banks, regulated investment
companies, real estate investment trusts, and other organizations.210
Accordingly, representatives from large firms, such as Honeywell Co.,
admitted that, although their firm would probably benefit from the new
investment credit, it would not be used by companies that most needed it to
make possible the expansion and rehabilitation of their equipment. 2 1' The
president of General Electric added, "With respect to the specifics of the
investment credit plan, however, I do not think it can go unnoticed that
202 Id.; see also William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 309, 311 n.4 (1972) (noting that the benefit of the investment tax credit is confined to those
having a positive tax liability).
203 William A. Klein, Some Basic Problems of Negative Income Taxation, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 776,
784.
204 Internship Opportunities: About ADA, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, http://www.ad
action.org/pages/about/intern-at-ada.php [https://perma.cc/UDW6-QL2A] (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
205 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1008-09 (statement of Robert R. Nathan, Vice
Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action).
20 6 1d. at 1009.
207 Id. at 1007 ("[If tax incentives are made more and more attractive, investors will put more and
more money into new plants and equipment.").
2 See infra notes 248-49, 258 and accompanying text.
209 Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 2912 (statement of Harry Flood Byrd,
Chairman, Senate Finance Committee) ("When you start a subsidy, it is hard to stop it. We don't stop
subsidies."); President's Proposal to Repeal Investment Tax Credit, supra note 168, at 187-90
(statement of Rep. Edward Garmatz).
210 See J.M. Walters, Recent Developments in the Federal Income Tax Laws-A Selective Survey
of Recent Legislative and Administrative Developments, 41 N.C. L. REv. 745, 748 (1963) (indicating
that special rules apply to mutual savings banks, cooperative banks, domestic building and loan
associations, regulated investment companies, and real estate trusts when utilizing the investment
credit).
21I 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1582 (statement of Paul B. Wishart, President,
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.).
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most business executives have shown a distinct lack of enthusiasm." 212 He,
too, saw a sign of change in Washington, and hoped for placing a higher
priority on capital formation and modernization through larger
expensing.213
Nevertheless, over time, some in the skeptical business community
began to support investment in machinery and equipment. 2 14 This shift was
manifested soon after the investment credit's debut, when an
unprecedented demand for machinery and equipment exceeded the nation's
capacity to produce such goods.2 15 Businessmen began to realize the
potential of the investment credit in providing a hefty tax break against
their tax bill. As a result, the government used the investment credit in
various ways to react to the changing economic conditions. 216 But prior to
that undertaking, the next subpart illustrates another disadvantage of the
investment credit that contributed to its repeal-its complex nature.
B. Complex Administration
Some members of business groups rejected the investment credit for
being too convoluted and difficult to administer.2 17 Small business
incumbents, such as the House and Senate Select Committees on Small
Business, used the investment credit's complex nature in their attempts to
persuade Congress to enact straightforward tax measures geared toward
small business. 2 18 They argued that the immediate expensing rule was a
better alternative, as it was simpler and easier to administer. 2 19 Instead of
212 Phillippe, supra note 169, at 307.
213 See id. ("The objective which the proposed investment credit is said to serve is precisely right.
Like some of these other suggestions I have mentioned, it is directed at meeting the important need for
correcting the climate for capital formation and modernization.").
214 Surrey, supra note 17, at 478.
215 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1962, at 484
(1962) (depicting the gradual increase in business expenditure in the areas of manufacturing and mining
equipment and communication, commercial, and miscellaneous); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1963, at 487 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT] (displaying the further increase in business expenditure between the years 1962 and 1963
in relation to manufacturing and mining equipment as well as communication, commercial, and
miscellaneous items); see also Heller, supra note 142, at 15 ("The longer-range economic prospect is
reassuring, even inviting. But right now, we find ourselves in the turbulent waters of high-pressure
prosperity.").
216 1963 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 215, at 487.
27 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 986-87 (statement of Joel Barlow, Member, Taxation
Committee of U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 468
(statement of Walter A. Slowinski, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
218 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1554 (statement of Henry J. Griswold, Chairman,
Taxation Committee, Smaller Business Association of New England) ("[T]o assist small business must
provide a realistic means of enabling smaller enterprises to retain a larger proportion of before-tax
earnings.").
219 Id at 1537 (statement of Clyde McFarlin, U.S. Independent Telephone Associations, and John
Clark, President, International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers).
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keeping a record of depreciation deductions over years, immediate
expensing allowed a write-off of the investment in the first year it was
placed in service. 22 0 Accordingly, the SBA and the small business
congressional committees advocated for the expansion of immediate
expensing limits to enable small businesses to retain and utilize pre-tax
earnings.2 2 1 They mentioned that the investment credit added various
complexities when applied to pass-through entities, and thus proposed to
make it more small business friendly.222
The investment credit had various limitations and exclusions,
exclusions within these exclusions, and different rates under different
conditions. 223 The recapture of the credit in the case of certain dispositions,
and many other provisions, made it impossible to comprehend and
administer. 22 4 The Treasury did not provide clear guidance for many of
these intricacies. 225 To illustrate just one complexity, the carryovers and
carrybacks rule of the unused portion of the credit was so convoluted that
professionals testified that any 1962 unused credit could affect tax returns
all the way through to 1973.226 For example, one of the investment credit's
problems was its initial basis adjustment provision, also known as the
"Long Amendment." 2 27 Any unused amount of credit could lower the tax
220 SETO, supra note 37, at 235.
221 Id.
22 Jay W. Glasmann, Investment Credit-One Year Later, 1964 PROC. ANN. TUL. TAX INST. 385,
405 (emphasizing the added complexities through an example of the intricacies that come into play in
making the selection of assets eligible for the credit under used property rules); see also I.R.C. § 48(b)-
(c) (1964) (providing special rules for seven years of carryover and carryback to tax year 1961 of
unused credits if the amount exceeds certain limitation in subsection (aX2) and carryover to nine and
ten years to subsequent excess).
223 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 22-23 (statement of Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the
Treasury); see also 108 CONG. REC 17,749 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Kerr) (discussing the investment
credit generally, including the types of property included in qualified investment and thus eligible for
the investment credit).
224 J.W. Baldwin, Investment Credit Problems of the Oil and Gas Industry, 1964 PROC. ANN. TUL.
TAX INST. 429, 430.
225 Id; see also Shirley v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-188, 2004 WL 1879831, at *2 (finding
the long historical tax litigation of the investment credit usable precedent in administrating other
investment property tax cases).
226 After the restoration of the credit, it was even more difficult to calculate the amount of the
credit. See Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 3018 (statement of D. Nelson Adams,
Chairman, Tax Committee, New York City Bar Association); 1967-34 I.R.B. 531 (noting computation
of the credit for taxable years beginning in 1966 and ending March 9, 1967 as well as for years
beginning in 1966 and ending in the suspension period).
227 Initially, the investment tax credit provisions as enacted in 1962 required reduction of the
depreciable tax base of any qualified property in an amount equal to the credit. Revenue Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2(b), 76 Stat. 960, 970 (repealed 1964). Adoption of this requirement in an
amendment proposed by Senator Russell Long reflected concern over the revenue cost of the credit.
See S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 19 (1962) (addressing the seven percent cost reduction of property and the
circumstances under which this amount is inappropriate as it is too large); see also Leslie M. Rapp,
Pensions for the Self-Employed: The Treasury Department-Finance Committee Plan, 16 TAX L. REV.
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payable in earlier or later years by means of carrybacks and carryovers, but
contained many limitations and intricate rules. 228 Other problems were
found in determining the useful life and time that the property was placed
in service. 22 9 The new credit restricted the type of property in which the
investment must be made and the amount of tax liability for the year that
could be offset by the credit. 23 0 In addition, corresponding sections were
added to reduce the amount of the credit, according to the useful life of
such property.231
Accordingly, many leaders23 2 -Of industry associations, 23 3 unions, and
labor organizations 2 34  C laimed that the varying percentage schedules
made the investment credit too complicated. Business executives from
large companies, such as the Edison Electric Institute, warned of the tax
credit's overly complex administration.235 In his article on the 1962 tax
reform, the President of General Electric commented that the new device is
"overloaded with special features and dispensations."236 Professionals
opined that the new investment credit was terribly complex and, in many
227, 249 (1960) ("Perhaps of equal significance was the Senator's statement that he would accept and
co-sponsor the Long amendment .... ). In 1964, Congress repealed the basis adjustment feature, thus
significantly liberalizing the credit and greatly increasing its value. See, e.g., '64 Investment Credit
Claim Was $1.3 Billion, WASH. POST, Aug 30, 1967, at C9 ("A total investment credit of $1.3 billion
was claimed in 1964 by half of the 649,000 corporations reporting income tax, the Internal Revenue
Service revealed yesterday."); see also Allaire Urban Karzon & Charles H. Coffin, Extension ofthe At-
Risk Concept to the Investment Credit: A Shotgun Approach to the Tax Shelter Problem, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 847, 852-53 (describing at-risk restrictions placed on taxpayers attempting to use the investment as
a tax shelter device).
' Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 28, at 2360; id at 3018 (statement of D. Nelson
Adams, Chairman, Tax Committee, New York City Bar Association); see also, e.g., I.R.C. § 46(b)
(1964) (outlining the allowance and limitations regarding carryback and carryover of unused credits);
H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at A17 (1962) (defining I.R.C. § 38 property and the definitions and special
rules necessary to the application of investment credit as outlined in § 48).
m Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(d) to (e), 28 Fed. Reg. 3033-35 (1963) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1); see also Report of the Committee on State and Local Taxes, 1962 A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N
203-06 (suggesting there was lack of uniformity in the treatment of investment credit by the various
states).
230 In return for the credit, the taxpayer reduced his basis for the property whose acquisition
produced the credit. S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 19 (1962).
231 I.R.C. §§ 38, 4648 (1964).
232 See Glasmann, supra note 222, at 386 n.9 (indicating that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
National Association of Manufacturers, the Controllers Institute, and the Machinery and Allied
Products Institute each made statements in opposition to the proposal).
m See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 1537 (statement of John Clark, President,
International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers).
" See, e.g., id. (arguing the incentive tax credit is too complex, discriminatory, and difficult to
administer).
23 See, e.g., 112 CONG. REc. 24,562 (1966) (statement of Messrs. Curtis, Utt, Betts, Schneebeli,
and Collier) ("The rules for determining which investments will qualify for the investment credit
during the suspension period because of prior commitments are exceedingly complex, and subject to
manipulation by the taxpayer.").
236 Phillippe, supra note 169, at 302, 307.
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respects, represented a departure from the conventional income tax
system. 23 7
Scholars were worried that the new credit would generate wasteful tax-
planning and litigation activity.2 3 8 The tax credit's limitations on income
tax liability, numerous exclusions, and complex carryback, carryover, and
recapture rules, made it prone to abuse. 23 9 Political figures, such as the
Chairman of the tax-writing Finance Committee, Senator Byrd (D-VA),
professed that the tax credit was "wrong in principle and unnecessary," and
"one of the largest loopholes that has ever been written into the law." 240
Furthermore, Senator Williams (R-DE), declared that this credit was too
complicated to understand without the assistance of a Harvard professor.2 4 1
However, the vast opposition to the investment credit by the business
community, professionals, and politicians did not stem solely from the
reasons stated above. Indeed, the credit was thought a complex tax subsidy.
But these debates did not occur in a historical vacuum. Another major
reason for the instability and eventual downfall of the investment credit is
the emergence of dislike toward cyclical fiscal activism.24 2 While it was
not clear whether the credit indeed incentivized new purchases or simply
accelerated their timing, the next subpart mirrors these difficulties while
describing the frequent use of the investment credit in the 1960s-1980s to
direct economic change.
21 See Knickerbocker, supra note 188, at 78; see also William H. Bradley & Philip D. Oliver,
Investment Tax Credit: The Illusory Incentive, 2 VA. TAX REv. 267, 270 (1983) ("[We recognize that
Congress has presented the Service with a statute inherently difficult to administer because of the many
close factual determinations it requires, and thus Congress shares the blame for undercutting the
incentive provided by ITC."); David R. Goode, Restoration of the Investment Tax Credit and
Accelerated Depreciation, 21 TAX LAW. 147, 160-61 (1968) (detailing the changes in the complex
computation of the credit).
" See, e.g., 1961 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 3378 (statement of Robert Anthoine,
Professor of Law, Columbia University); James E. Merritt, Planning Under the "Repealed" Investment
Tax Credit, 56 A.B.A. J. 704, 707 (1970) (providing some possible planning strategies for taxpayers);
John J. Raymond, Comments on the Revenue Act of 1962, 41 MICH. ST. B.J. 10, 16 (1962) (stating that
there will be a rise in litigation and an increase in activity among accountants); see also Daniel N.
Shaviro, Rethinking Anti-Tax Shelter Rules: Protecting the Earned Income Tax Base, 71 TAXES 859,
860 (1993) ("This was a key characteristic of the classic 1960s-to-1980s tax shelters that used
accelerated depreciation and, often, inflated basis, but it extends further.").
239 The basis of property subject to the credit was reduced by the amount of the investment credit
regardless of whether the credit was used immediately, via the carryback, or via the carryover. These
provisions are referred to as the Long amendment, which was proposed before the Senate Finance
Committee. See 108 CONG. REC. 17,450 (1962) (statement of Sens. Douglas and Gore) (assessing the
loss of revenue from this feature of the bill at somewhere between $1.1 billion to $1.4 billion); id at
17,747 (statement of Sen. Kerr) (describing the change in legislation).
2 Id at 17,740, 17,742 (statements of Sen. Byrd).
241 Id at 17,744 (statement of Sen. Williams).
242 See supra Part ll.A (discussing how the Department of Commerce took measures to reform
depreciation policy and provide incentives to invest, as well as Congress's decision to implement small
business tax preferences).
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C. Cyclical Fiscal Activism: An Era of Trial and Error
1. The First Years
Indeed, as Figure 3 in the Appendix demonstrates, in the years that
followed the enactment of the investment credit, the nation witnessed an
increase in capital formation rates, a rise in Gross National Product (GNP),
and a decrease in the unemployment rate. 243  Business investment
expenditures rose to record levels.244 Although it was not clear whether
these changes resulted from the adoption of the tax credit or other political
and economic conditions, New Economists celebrated this upward trend as
proof of the validity of their new fiscal instrument. 2 4 5
The investment credit was depicted as a powerful cyclical device, and
a prevailing method to spur changes in the market by stimulating
investments in machinery and equipment. 2" However, while the Kennedy
administration had intended the investment credit to be permanent,2 47 the
Johnson administration believed it to be a temporary, transitional measure
that had been created to resolve economic deficiencies in previous years.248
The Johnson administration was reluctant to extend the investment credit
because of its cyclical association and the ambivalence toward fiscal
activism.249
Once the justification for providing investment incentives no longer
existed, with businesses overspending on capital investments, the Johnson
243 The average real GNP growth rate between 1961-1970 was 4.21% compared to 3.55%
between 1951-1960. Paul Davidson, Global Employment and Open Economy Macroeconomics, in
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL EcONOMICS: POST-KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVES 9, 22, 35 (J. Deprez
& J.T. Harvey eds., 1999).
2" See, e.g., M.J. Rossant, Capital Expenditures: A Study of Administration's Efforts to Stimulate
More Industry Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1962, at 56 ("It is the first concert sign that businessmen
are going to take advantage of the depreciation revision and the investment tax credit now available.");
New Orders for Machine Tools Advanced Sharply for October, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1962, at 58 ("Net
new orders for machine tools-the machines that make machinery-advanced sharply in October.").
245 See Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 127, at 211-12 (statement of Nathaniel
Goldfinger, Director, Department of Research, AFL-CIO) (noting the increase in business outlays for
new plants and equipment in the early 1960s and how corporate investments in those technologies at
the 1960s rate is no longer necessary).
24 Surrey, supra note 17, at 478.
247 Cook, supra note 170, at 227 (stating that both the accelerated depreciation and the investment
credit were instituted as permanent parts of the tax code); see also Hearing on Revenue Act of 1962,
supra note 28, at 2905-12 (statement of Walter A. Slowinski, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("Well, it
is intended to be permanent, I am confident of that.").
248 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 125, at 75 ("Policy to reverse recession or
speed recovery often calls for a temporary boost in private purchasing power.").
249 See Easy-Money Policy Is Believed in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1966, at 30 (noting that
President Johnson asked Congress to suspend the investment tax credit); Alan L. Otten, Johnson's
Dilemma: Hard Choices on Budget for the Great Society, Vietnam Face President, WALL ST. J., Dec.
21, 1965, at I (stating that President Johnson's advisors believed skillful budgeting could avoid an
immediate tax increase).
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administration sought to minimize their scope.250 Increased involvement in
the Vietnam War intensified this picture.25' Sharper defense costs further
accelerated the rate of economic activity.252 The tax credit was thought to
add unsuitable emphasis to that boom in capital outlays, which created
inflationary demand pressures. 253 The record pace of investment in plants
and equipment was creating excessive investment demands and
considerable inflationary pressures. 2 54  Efforts to curb these pressures
necessitated restraining this capital-spending boom. 25 5
2. 1966-1969: Suspension, Restoration, and Repeal
In light of the apparent over-performance of the economy, New
Economists quickly assumed an instrumental approach, utilizing tax policy
as a temporary stabilizing device.256 To achieve this goal, they suspended
the investment credit in 1966.257 Proponents of the suspension of the
investment credit explained that a temporary holdup would be useful in
250 The Johnson administration used the freed revenues in a series of "Great Society" legislations
that upheld civil rights, Medicare, Medicaid, and environmental protection, among others. See, e.g.,
Edwin L. Dale, Jr., Spending to Rise for Great Society: $3.3-Billion More Provided in '67 Budget-
Cost of War Is Put at $10.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1966, at I (discussing how Great Society
programs addressing health, education, poverty and pollution have experienced a growth of $3.3
billion); Thomas J. Foley, Great Society in Search of Great Ideas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1965, at Ll
(stating that the Great Society must address new challenges to fully pursue and achieve its goals);
Johnson Signs 8 Bills Supporting Great Society: Hails 'Great' 89th Congress, 'Great Day' Back Home
and G.O.P. Support, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1966, at 20 (discussing bills addressing education, urban
renewal, healthcare, consumer protection, medical training, and pollution).
" See Shaviro, supra note 14, at 109 (referencing the United States' decision to simultaneously
take part in the Vietnam War and institute expensive domestic programs without tax increases as an
example of the conflict over the merits of tax reform and its political appeal).
252 See Surrey, supra note 17, at 478-79 (explaining how the costs of the Vietnam War created a
sharp rise in the defense budget and amplified the rate of economic activity).
253 Id at 478 ("A sharply rising defense budget superimposed on the rapidly expanding private
economy suddenly accelerated the rate of economic activity."); see also Hearings on the President's
1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 22, at 519 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic
Studies, Brookings Institution) (arguing that suspending the investment credit in 1966 would have
resulted in lower prices); Table of Historical Inflation Rates, supra note 51 (illustrating increased
inflation rates between 1965 and 1969).
' See Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 127, at 213-16 (statement of Nathaniel
Goldfinger, Director, Department of Research, AFL-CIO) (discussing how increased spending by
businesses on equipment and plants is unsustainable and is generating inflationary pressures in the
private economy).
255 See George E. Zeitlin et al., Federal Income Taxation, 1967 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 717, 719
nn. 11-12 for a discussion of the New Economics in the congressional reports.
256 See Kenyon E. Poole, Some Aspects of the Role of Government in Stable Growth, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 464, 481-82 (1968) (stating that the role of government in maintaining and balancing stable
market growth was also observed in foreign countries' experience of achieving success in establishing
a series of plans to correct instability and a rise in standards of economic performance).
257 See Suspensions of Investment Credit and Accelerated Depreciation: Hearings on H.R. 17607
Before the Comm. on Fin., 89th Cong. 36-45 (1966) [hereinafter Suspension of Investment Credit
Hearings] (statements of Treasury Secretary Fowler).
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encouraging businesses to delay capital investments, until a later time that
might be more suited to the economic conditions of the market.258 Those
who supported the retention of the investment credit warned against
introducing more uncertainty into the market, either by creating a stampede
to quickly deliver equipment before the effective date of the suspension, or
by postponing expansion plans until the suspension period ended.259
Only a few years after its enactment, the investment credit's biggest
adversary, the Chamber of Commerce, began to advocate for making the
tax credit a permanent part of the tax structure.260 Once constituents
realized the significant monetary benefits of the new credit, concerns for
certainty and neutrality were pushed aside.26 1 These different viewpoints
demonstrated the insufficient knowledge and inadequate analysis of the
effects of the investment credit as a countercyclical tool and an economic
stabilizer. 26 2 The few surveys that were conducted were limited and
displayed little prospective impact on the business decisions of
modernizing facilities and incentivizing capital investments.26 3 Other
studies on the future effect of temporary suspension of the investment
credit on capital investments continued to cast considerable doubts on the
effectiveness of the tax credit in spurring capital investments.26
258 E.g., 112 CONG. REc. 22,049 (1966) (prepared statement of Pres. Johnson) ("I recommend that
the Congress promptly make inoperative, for a temporary period, those special incentives for plant and
equipment investment and commercial construction that currently contribute to overheating the
economy."); id. at 22,064 (statement of Rep. Wyatt); see also Suspension of Investment Credit
Hearings, supra note 257, at 5 (statement of Treasury Secretary Fowler) ("The temporary removal of
these special tax incentives to investment will ... contribute to a restraint of inflationary developments
that are proving disruptive of the financial markets and placing excessive strain on the capital goods
industries .... ).
5 See, e.g., 112 CONG. REc. 22,393 (1966) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("A repeal of the
investment tax credit alone and no other action would achieve nothing."); id. at 23,862 (statement of
Sen. Javits) ("To suspend credit for 16 months will induce businessmen to deter marginal projects until
the credit is restored."); id at 17,536 (statement of Rep. Ullman) ("In order to avoid disastrous rush of
plant and equipment orders, the suspension is effective immediately . . . ."); Suspension ofInvestment
Credit Hearings, supra note 257, at 165 ("If the threat of enactment is taken seriously by industry, such
a proposal is bound to touch off a stampede for the acceleration of equipment deliveries scheduled after
the deadline (its enactment would of course have the same effect). Again the result will be the opposite
of that intended. There considerations raise grave doubts about the effectiveness of credit suspension as
a means of restraint, quite apart from the administrative difficulties to which it gives rise." (emphasis
omitted)).
260 Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 127, at 64 (statement of Nathaniel
Goldfinger, Director, Department of Research, AFL-CIO).
261 Cook, supra note 170, at 231.262 Id. at 233.
263 See Supplemental and Minority Views of Sens. Paul Douglas & Albert Gore, supra note 178,
at 1100 (describing surveys on the meager effect of the investment credit on capital equipment
investments decisions).
264 NAT'L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., INVESTMENT STATISTICS: SPECIAL SURVEY: THE
SUSPENSION OF TAx INCENTIVES-IMPACT ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT (1966) (surveying 1,000 of the
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Ultimately, Congress temporarily suspended the investment credit for a
short period.2 65 The role of the Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 was to employ
fiscal restraint for anti-inflationary purposes. 26 For the first time in history,
tax policy was openly utilized as a short-range economic stabilizer as
opposed to its revenue-raising role in previous decades. In a press
conference, President Johnson explained, "We won't give you a bonus to
do what we don't want you to do." 267
Yet, even while suspending the credit, the government was already
contemplating the early termination of the suspension. 2 6 8 Since the key
reason for suspending the tax credit was to slow down all equipment
purchase activity, the suspension period covered not only property actually
built or acquired, but also property ordered during the moratorium
period.269
The market reaction to the suspension was noticeable. Capital
investment began to taper off.2 70 Massive cancellation of orders of
equipment and machinery was followed by a period of credit holdup.27 '
The growth rate of investment in plants and equipment dropped to 4% in
1967, down from 14/o-17% in previous years.272 The suspension impacted
largest manufacturers on future effects of the temporary suspension of the tax credit and finding an
anticipated 1.30/-2.8% reduction).
265 Congress suspended the Investment Credit from October 10, 1966 through December 31,
1967. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 89m CONG., SUMMARY OF THE ACT
TEMPORARILY SUSPENDING THE INVESTMENT CREDIT AND LIMITING THE USE OF ACCELERATED
DEPRECIATION 1467 (Comm. Print 1966).
26 Surrey, supra note 17, at 479.
67 Press Conference of President Lyndon Johnson, Statement on the Message on Fiscal Policy
(Sept. 8, 1966), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27843 [https://perma.cc/9HE6-
GGA9]. In his 1966 Economic Report, President Johnson added, "improvement of our tax system is a
continuing need which will concern this Administration and which deserves the support of all
Americans." I12 CONG. REC. 1268 (1966). Contributing to suspension of the investment credit was the
objection of some congressional representatives to submit to a theory that required them to change the
laws and direct the market so frequently. See, e.g., Hearings on the President's 1967 Tax Proposals,
supra note 22, at 103 (statement of Rep. Gilbert); Representative John W. Byrnes, Address Before the
International Fiscal Association (Apr. 20, 1967), reprinted in 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) §
6178; Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Address at the American Enterprise Institute Symposium (Apr.
20, 1967), reprinted in 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) § 6178.
26 Suspension of Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 257, at 382 (statements of Donald B.
Thrush, Chairman, Government Affairs Committee, Printing Industries of America, Inc., and Edmund
F. Martin, Chairman and CEO, Bethlehem Steel Corp.).
269 That would have been unlikely had companies been able to continue to place orders for
manufacture and merely defer the delivery dates. See id at 383 (statement of Edmund F. Martin,
Chairman and CEO, Bethlehem Steel Corp.).
270 Hearing on the President's 1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 22, at 119 (statement of Treasury
Secretary Fowler).
271 See Hearings on H.R. 6950 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 90th Cong. 6-7 (1967)
(statement of Treasury Secretary Fowler).
272 Infra Appendix fig.3; see also 113 CONG. REC. 5946 (1967) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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several industries, which saw a fall in the number of tool and machinery
orders of over 80% since going into effect.2 73
Consequently, the Johnson administration pushed for tax increases,2 74
relying on the CEA and leading economists, such as Joseph Pechman, who
supported fiscal management.275 Soon after, in March 1967, the
administration was back in Congress with a restoration bill. 2 76 The
suspension lasted only five months; it was brought back on May 31, 1967,
and was applied retroactively to March 9, 1967.277 George Terborgh,
research director of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute,
summarized this period stating, "While the adoption of the bill mercilessly
ended a fiasco, it did not terminate the headaches of the episodes." 2 78
While an economic effect during the cyclical use of the investment
credit was notable, it was not clear that the instrument indeed spurred new
capital investment that would not have happened otherwise rather than
advancing the occurrence of already anticipated purchases. Studies on the
projected effect of the credit on spurring capital investments showed only a
modest expected reduction, if any, among the largest manufacturing
companies at that time.2 79 Professionals began to question the effectiveness
of utilizing the investment credit as an intermittent apparatus.2 80
Northwestern University economist Kanyon Poole emphasized at that
time that it is not clear special investment tax incentives are truly
needed. 281 He argued that investments and savings are not necessarily
273 113 CONG. REc. 6004 (1967) (statement of Sen. Carlson) (reporting that industries such as
railroad equipment manufacturers experienced a drop in orders of eighty percent).
274 E.g., Hearings on the President's 1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 22, at 1-7 (prepared
statement of Pres. Johnson).
2" Id. at 518-25 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, Brookings
Institution).
" Restoration of Investment Credit and Accelerated Depreciation Provisions, 1 PUB. PAPERS 303
(Mar. 9, 1967). Although the bill was swiftly passed in the House, the Senate Finance Committee
disagreed with the changes made in the House version, which retroactively expanded the types of cases
in which the tax incentives were to be made available. The committee reported that the House version
of the bill was discriminatory against taxpayers who postponed investments compared to taxpayers who
ordered equipment or began construction during the suspension period. S. REP. No. 90-79, at 2 (1967).
m H.R. 6950, 90th Cong. (1967); Gerald J. Holtz & Harold R. Jenkins, Restoration of Investment
Credit and Accelerated Depreciation, 45 TAXEs 660, 660 (1967) (reporting that the suspension period
was shortened to March 9, 1967, instead of December 31, 1967, and eventually took place from
October 10, 1966 to March 9, 1967, with the limitation on the amount of investment credit that could
be claimed in any one year increased from 25% to 50% as of March 9, 1967).
2" Kraus, supra note 1, at 61 (citing TER.BORGH, supra note 114, at 155)). Others argued that the
effect of the tax credit was noticeable, to some degree, in marginal industries and on small businesses.
Cook, supra note 170, at 233.279 Supra note 264.
280 Supplemental and Minority Views of Sens. Paul Douglas & Albert Gore, supra note 178, at
I100; Cook, supra note 170, at 231.
281 Poole, supra note 256, at 465.
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created independently and as an outcome of tax inducements. 2 82
Congressional representatives refused to fully submit to a theory that
required them to change the laws and direct the market so frequently. 28 3 In
his role as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy at that time,
Stanley S. Surrey promoted the enactment of the new tax credit.2 84
However, after stepping down from his position, Surrey criticized the use
of the credit as a countercyclical device.285 Although the investment credit
was kept under the radar in other countries,286 the legislative process in the
United States made it impossible to avoid signaling to the market when the
tax benefit was scheduled to be suspended or restored. This was said to
inherently harm the nature and effectiveness of the tax measure. 2 87 Support
of fiscal activism and cyclical fine-tuning began to dwindle.
The growing U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict, with peak
involvement in 1968, continued to create a build-up in capital spending and
deployment of war-related industries.2 88 In 1969, investments in new plants
and equipment were at a high point.289 The investment credit was sought to
augment these inflationary pressures by stimulating demand even
further.2 90 As a result, the Treasury sought to place a higher national
priority on the need for general taxpayer relief. In his tax reform message
on April 21, 1969, President Nixon repealed the investment credit, viewing
it only as an emergency instrument and transitional measure to correct
28 Id. at 475.
See, e.g., Byrnes, supra note 267; Mills, supra note 267.
284 Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 127, at 243 (statement of Stanley S.
Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) ("These effects would cover a wider range of investment-
including inventories and accounts receivable-than would a change in the investment credit."); see
also Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAx L. REV. 83, 144 (2007)
(describing the central role of Stanley Surrey in the foreign policy arena).
285 Later on, Surrey argued against utilizing the credit as a countercyclical device since the effect
of the investment credit is also directly influenced by corporate tax changes and indirectly by individual
income tax rates. Surrey, supra note 17, at 481.
286 Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 127, at 60 (statement of Robert A. Gordon,
Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley) ("In a different form, the Swedish
government has been using tax incentives to investment for a number of years as an integral part of its
stabilizing fiscal policy." (emphasis added)).
m Id. at 299 (statement of Norman B. Ture, National Bureau of Economic Research) ("If
compensatory action is substantially delayed, whether because of the recognition lag or because of
tardy agreement about the kind and amount of action to take, efforts to stabilize conceivably could
contribute to instability, particularly if the speed with which compensatory measures take effect is
overestimated.").
28 Heller, supra note 162, at 17.
28 See infra Appendix fig.3 (portraying business expenditures for new plan and equipment from
1948 to 1971).29 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS
PRESENTED IN STATEMENTS SUBMITrED TO COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS WITH RESPECT TO
TREASURY PROPOSAL TO REPEAL THE INVESTMENT CREDIT 1-6 (Comm. Print 1969).
2016] 917
deficiencies in the tax structure on a temporary basis.2 9' The investment
credit was thought to have "fulfilled its purpose of increasing investments
during a period of slack demands and has outlived its usefulness as a
stimulant to the economy." 29 2 The shift in tax policy and discourse on the
role of the tax system was underway. From now on, public debate turned to
the question, "should taxes be used to implement economic policy?"
Answering this query, James E. Merritt wrote:
[we] must consider this much larger question: have the
opponents of the use of tax laws as an economic incentive
convinced the administration and Congress to refrain from
the use of these tax incentives as a matter of principle, or are
tax incentives an irresistible method for attempting to achieve
desired social and economic results? 29 3
The next subpart reveals that this repeal, too, did not last long. The
experimentation in fiscal activism was still in motion.
3. 1971-1975: Reinstatement and Increase
During 1970, inflationary pressures grew stronger than at any time
since the Korean War, and were not restricted to domestic monetary and
fiscal policies;29 4  there had been a dire competition with foreign
manufacturers and an ongoing balance-of-payments problem.295 Calls to
restore the investment credit were accompanied by pleas for fiscal restraint
and a compulsory savings plan. 296 The Federal Reserve warned that
"violent price increases that stem from such sources cannot readily be
handled with customary weapons of economic stabilization policy."2 97
291 EcoNoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 75 (1969), http://www.presidency.ucsb.eduleconomic
reports/1969.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R4K-7CZS] ("The net stimulus from these actions [enactment of
an investment tax credit] worked in the right direction, but was inadequate to the major task of reaching
potential output.").
292 Congressman Jerry Ford, Your Washington Review, FORD LIBR. MUSEUM (July 2, 1969),
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0054/4525476.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VYE-PB
XK] (describing President Nixon and the Ways and Means Committee sentiment about the repeal of the
investment credit).
293 Merritt, supra note 238, at 707.
294 Heller, supra note 162, at 19.
291 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-533 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825; S. REP. NO. 92-437
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1931 ("[The credit] should be restored as a means of
providing stimulus to the lagging domestic economy by reducing the cost of capital to U.S.
manufacturers ... to place them in a more competitive position with foreign manufacturers and in that
manner [would] help improve our present serious balance-of-payments situation.").
" Statement by Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Before the Joint Economic Committee, August 3, 1973, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 567, 570, 572 (1973)
[hereinafter Statement by Arthur F. Burns] ("Additional fiscal restraint is also needed at this time....
[I nvestment tax credit or a compulsory savings plan-that could be quickly reversed . . .
297 Id. at 569.
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Notwithstanding his declarations to dogmatically reject the idea of cyclical
fiscal activism, President Nixon began to recognize New Economics
theory's political appeal and its political use in attaining certain economic
objectives.298 Following the CEA recommendation, he announced a series
of fiscal policy actions in line with New Economics. 29 9
As a first step, President Nixon put in place a price control program on
certain foods, wages, and domestic goods in order to moderate inflationary
pressures. 300 Second, he instructed the Federal Reserve to restrain
monetary policy and limit Federal expenditures. 301 Finally, he reinstituted
the investment credit,30 2 and while the Nixon administration recommended
reinstating a 10% credit,3 03 Congress restored the credit at its historical 7%
level for budgetary reasons.30 Scholars commented that a bloc of pro-
business votes made that legislative process, including the restoration of
the investment credit, politically effortless. 30 5
Economic recovery began to occur in early 1971 and gained
considerable momentum during 1972.306 Employment and income levels
increased strongly; sales and new orders gradually improved, creating an
environment of moderate price increases. 3 07 The rate of expansion in
aggregate economic activity rose further in the closing months of 1972,
and rapid expansion continued into 1973.308 The Federal Reserve
acknowledged a number of factors that assisted this economic recovery and
gain in business capital spending, amongst them the restoration of the
29 On August 15, 1971, President Nixon ended the international convertibility of the dollar to
gold, which resulted in the so-called "Nixon Shock." There was no correspondent plan put in place to
revalue currencies until more than a year later. Credit demands were unusually heavy, and interest rates
were at extremely high levels, at over eight percent. See ELLIOT W. BROWNLEE, FUNDING THE
MODERN AMERICAN STATE: 1941-1945, at 209 (2013).
2 Id. at 215; Statement by Arthur F. Burns, supra note 296, at 569-72.
30 See Heller, supra note 162, at 17-18 (discussing the combination of wage-price controls and
tax cuts in 1971, which were intended to "subdue inflation and energize expansion").
301 See id at 18 (noting the "about-face" from "ease to tightness" of the Federal Reserve).
3' Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 101, 85 Stat. 497, 498-99.
0 See Tax Proposals Contained in the President's New Economic Policy: Hearings on the Tax
Proposals Contained in the President's New Economic Policy Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
92d Cong. 7-8, 11 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on the Tax Proposals Contained in the President's
New Economic Policy] (statement of Treasury Secretary John B. Connally); Gerard M. Brannon, The
Revenue Act of 1971-Do Tax Incentives Have New Life?, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 891, 897
(1973). After August 15, 1972, the credit would have been reduced to five percent. Hearings on the Tax
Proposals Contained in the President's New Economic Policy, supra, at 11 (statement of Treasury
Secretary John B. Connally).
30 Revenue Act of 1971 § 101; Brannon, supra note 303, at 897.
305 E.g., Brannon, supra note 303, at 897.
3 1972: A Year ofAccelerating Recovery, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 1 (1973).
307 d
as See id at 4 (describing how the business capital investment contributed to the overall strength
of the economy).
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investment credit in late 1971.309 Arthur F. Bums, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, proposed a permanent interchangeable version of the
investment credit, in accordance with cyclical fiscal activism principles, 310
but his proposal was stymied by the Nixon administration, which refused
to fully commit to the New Economics philosophy.31'
From January 1973 until December 1974, the world experienced one
of its major stock markets downturns in modem history. 3 12 This market
recession was exacerbated in November 1973, when a spike in oil prices
occurred as a result of an oil embargo issued by the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries against the United States for its
involvement in the Middle East conflict.313 The sharp increase in oil prices,
coupled with high government spending due to the Vietnam War, led the
nation to a stagnation period of three years.314 The U.S. economy's GDP
growth rate dropped to 2.1%, and inflation rates soared from 3.4% in 1972
to 12.3% in 1974. " In order to curb inflation and augment the effect of the
investment credit on spurring capital investments, President Ford followed
the advice of New Economists at the CEA and recommended that the
investment credit be increased and made refundable. 3 16 Though the latter
s Id; see also Federal Fiscal Policy, 1965-72, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 383, 395 (1973) ("[Tihe
reinstitution of the investment credit in December 1971 was a contributing factor to the fast economic
growth that was experienced in 1972.").
"o See The 1973 Economic Report of the President: Hearings Before the J. Econ. Comm., 93d
Cong. 396-97, 401 (1973) (statement of Arthur Bums, Chairman, Federal Reserve) (noting the
expansion of economic activity during 1972, that such expansion was likely to continue, and urging
Congress to consider a permanent variable investment tax credit to facilitate a more effective
stabilization policy); see also Arthur Bums, Address at the International Monetary Conference: Some
Problems ofControl Banking 4 (June 6, 1973) (arguing that the "rather large fluctuation characteristic"
of business investment was a "major force" behind economic instability, and recommending that the
tax investment credit remain in effect continuously).
." Robert Eisner, Business Investment Preferences, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 486, 490 (1974).
312 See E. Philip Davis, Comparing Bear Markets-1973 and 2000, 183 NAT'L INST. ECON. REV.
78, 78-79 (2003) (comparing market weakness in the G-7); see also Bryan Burrough, Back in Action:
Companies Take Over the Takeover Game from Flashy Raiders, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 1
(describing how low prices resulting from the market crash were followed by hostile corporate
takeovers).
313 See generally VITO A. STAGLIANO, A POLICY OF DISCONTENT: THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL
ENERGY STRATEGY 23 (2001) (discussing how, after OAPEC announced the 1973 oil embargo,
reduced its production levels, and closed the Suez Canal, oil supplies to the international market
severely decreased, world oil prices quadrupled, and President Nixon feared what he called "the most
acute shortages of energy since World War 11"); James W. McKie, The United States, in THE OIL
CRISIS 73, 73 (Raymond Vernon ed., 1976) (discussing the political and economic impacts of the oil
embargo); Gene Smith, Northeast Is Bracing Itselffor a Possible Energy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1973, at I (describing the scope and impact of the oil crisis).
"' Figure 4 in the Appendix illustrates this short period of stagnation, as reflected in new capital
equipment investments. See also TODD A. KNOOP, RECESSIONS AND DEPRESSIONS: UNDERSTANDING
BUSINESS CYCLES 165 (2004).
31s Davis, supra note 312, at 81 tbl.4.
16 H.R. Doc. NO. 93-366, at 4 (1974); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax
Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 679, 714
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goal was not attained, in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975317 the Ford
administration succeeded in passing a major tax cut coupled with an
increase of the investment credit from 7% to 10%."'
4. Final Years
By mid-1975, the economy had recovered and returned to its normal
capacity. 3 19 Businessmen and professionals continued to call for permanent
extension of the investment credit. 32 0 Its cyclical nature-that is, its on-
again-off-again character-made it an unreliable factor in facility
planning.321 Congress responded by enacting the Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977322 that kept the investment credit temporarily at
its ten percent level.323 In 1979, an increase in Iranian oil prices created a
worldwide energy crisis. 324 Spiking oil prices led the government to tighten
its monetary policy to control inflation, and a short recession followed
(1976). For arguments in support of making the tax credit fully refundable, see generally Paul R.
McDaniel, Tax Reform and the Revenue Act of 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and Lessons, 14 B.C. INDUS.
& CoM. L. REv. 813, 838-39 (1973) (proposing a refundable tax credit that would eliminate tax
expenditures for taxpayers, yet continue to provide federal financial benefits through the tax system);
Emil M. Sunley, Jr., Towards a More Neutral Investment Credit, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 209, 216 (1973)
(arguing that the investment credit could be made more "neutral" if it were, inter alia, fully refundable).
317 See H.R. REP. No. 94-19, at 25 (1975) (listing the Tax Reduction Act of 1975's investment
credit as one of the "nonrefundable" credits).
"' Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §§ 201-301, 89 Stat. 26, 28-36 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). By 1975, the prices of industrial raw materials had begun to decline
and employment and production had decreased rapidly. Statements to Congress: Statement by Arthur F.
Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Before the Committee on Ways
and Means, US. House of Representatives, January 30, 1975, 61 FED. RES. BULL. 60, 69 (1975).
Unemployment had risen sharply to over seven percent of the labor force. Id at 60. Accordingly, the
administration sought to increase the extent of the investment credit to temporarily boost capital
demand and to encourage greater monetary and credit expansion. Id. at 62. In a statement before the
Committee on Ways and Means, Arthur Bums said: "[W]hile the Federal Reserve recognizes all this,
we are also mindful of the lesson of history that rapid growth of the money supply will lay the base for
a new wave of inflation." Id. at 63.
31 See Robert M. Coen & Bert G. Hickman, Investment and Growth in an Econometric Model of
the United States, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 214, 219 (1980).
' For a law partner's argument in support of the permanent extension of the investment credit,
see John C. Argue, The Investment Credit After the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, 51 L.A. B.J. 194, 194
(1975) (describing the investment credit as very significant for the business-professional community).
See also Francis P. Carolan & Timothy C. Sentner, Added Potential in the Investment Credit, 28 TAX
ExEcuTIvE 222, 222 (1976) (arguing that the investment credit is the most important measure that the
federal government took to assist businesses in obtaining capital).
321 See, e.g., W. Bruce Thomas, How to Increase Capital Formation, 29 TAX EXECUTIVE 1, 12
(1977) (calling for an increase in measures to create capital, including increasing the investment credit
to twelve percent and making it permanent).
32 S. REP. No. 95-66, at 1 (1977).
323 Id at 63. The Revenue Act of 1978 permanently extended the maximum ten percent credit.
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 311-17, 92 Stat. 2763, 2824-30 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 46-50 (2012)).
324 James D. Hamilton, Historical Causes of Postwar Oil Shocks and Recessions, 6 ENERGY J. 97,
111 (1985).
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during 1981-1982.325 Accordingly, the Senate Finance Committee
recommended increasing the investment credit to stimulate capital
formation and improve the nation's competitiveness in international
trade.326 Still, dislike toward cyclical fiscal activism kept the investment
credit at its previous levels for several years.327 Aggressive tax planning
and vast tax shelter activity exacerbated the public hostility toward tax
preferences generally and the investment credit specifically.328 In the major
1986 tax reform, this skepticism prevailed. Tax scholars Ajay Mehrotra
and Joseph Thorndike described the nature of tax policy during that period:
The changing political and economic conditions of the 1960s
and 1970s brought new unease to the nation's fiscal debates.
Spiraling inflation-induced by increased government
spending on the Vietnam conflict and Great Society
programs-together with an oil crisis and the demise of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates all signaled an
end to post-WWII American economic prosperity and
hegemony. The resulting loss of faith in government to
manage the economy led to the emergence of an anti-statist,
neoliberal ideology that found expression in tax policy.... In
Washington, piecemeal erosion of the tax base-a
phenomenon at least as old as the income tax-left many
experts worried about the future of the revenue system. As
exemptions, deductions, credits, and other tax benefits
littered the Internal Revenue Code, tax specialists pondered
the prospects of broadening the income tax base by removing
many of these tax benefits. Meanwhile, a wave of tax revolts
in states around the nation produced a surge of new tax and
spending limits, recasting the landscape of subnational
politics. 329
As a result of that atmosphere, the most sweeping tax legislation in the
history of the Internal Revenue Code to this day was manifested in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.330 This act reflected a major shift in tax policy, which
" Id at 111-12 (describing the correlation between the energy crisis and the recession in the
United States).
" The Senate Finance Committee declared that "present rules for determining depreciation
allowances and the investment credit need to be replaced because they do not provide the investment
stimulus that is essential for economic expansion." S. REP. No. 144, at 47 (198 1).
* See infra Appendix fig.2.
3 Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L.
REV. 401, 424-26 (1989) (describing the tax shelter activity from the late 1960s through 1986).
329 Mehrotra & Thorndike, supra note 13, at 618-19.
" Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Rodger A. Boiling et al., The
Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification or Complication?, 39 TAX EXECUTIVE 235, 239 (1987) ("The
1986 Act is the most sweeping tax legislation in the 73-year history of the Internal Revenue Code.").
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at that time focused on simplicity, fairness, equity, and economic
neutrality.33 1 Support for a "fairer" tax code and tax neutrality received
growing bipartisan support set to scrutinize complex and costly tax
sections and avoid fiscal activism. 33 2 The 1986 tax reform focused on
lowering rates and expanding the base by eliminating many tax
preferences.333 To compensate for the losses in revenue caused by
individual income tax reduction and corporate rate reduction, the 1986 Act
repealed a host of exclusions, deductions, and credits primarily used by
corporate taxpayers.334 Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Act, the revenue
loss estimates from the investment credit for 1986 were projected at $30.9
billion,3 which together with its dubious and complex nature made it an
obvious target for repeal. The ideological aversion to cyclical fiscal
activism and skepticism regarding its effect on the economy reinforced the
notion that the investment credit should be put to rest.336
The immediate expensing rule was left intact for its small business
affiliation and relative simplicity. Prior to President Reagan signing the
1986 Act into law, lobbyists and other interest groups acted vigorously to
reinstate the investment credit without much success.337 Yet, in proposing
331 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT: UNRESOLVED ISSUES 24 (1978)
(noting that corporate tax incentives interfere with the free flow of market forces); see also Eisner,
supra note 311, at 486 (describing how tax incentives for businesses distort the economy); Charles R.
Hulten & James W. Robertson, The Taxation of High Technology Industries, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 327, 327
(1984) (concluding that the market should allocate resources instead of the government trying to pick
winners); Jonathan R. Kesselman et al., Tax Credits for Employment Rather than Investment, 67 AM.
EcON. REV. 339, 348 (1977) (concluding that an employment tax credit would have benefited the labor
market far more than an investment tax credit).
332 Bolling et al., supra note 330, at 237 (citing Treasury Secretary James A. Baker Ill remarking,
"This is a very significant change. We're going to have a far more efficient system than we have
now").
313 See id. at 239 (noting efforts by Congress to eliminate tax breaks and loopholes); Simmons,
supra note 24, at 151.
31 Simmons, supra note 24, at 151; Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395, 439 (1987). Opponents of the repeal of business incentives, such as
Representative Marjorie S. Holt, opposed the effect such action would have on the economy. See 65
CONG. DIG. 51 (1986) (statement of Rep. Holt) ("My concern is the economic consequences of the
legislation, and I have concluded that it will retard capital formation and investment, restrict economic
growth, and cause higher unemployment.").
33 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: CURRENT ISSUES AND FIVE-YEAR BUDGET
PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1982-86, at 81-84 (1981). For 1990, the revenue loss was projected
at $8 billion. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1986-1990, at 10-21 (Comm. Print 1985).
31 See Hearings on the Tax Proposals Contained in the President's New Economic Policy, supra
note 303, at 1178-81 (statement of James S. Fralick, Assistant Professor of Economics, Fordham
University) (detailing the various credibility problems, including questionable economic impact and
some political dilemmas, that the investment credit has presented in history).
. See Joan C. Szabo, Welcome to Tax Reform, NATION'S BUS., Nov. 1986, at 20, 22 (discussing
calls for change to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 before its passage); see also Bolling et al., supra note
330, at 237, 243.
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to repeal the investment credit, the Ways and Means Committee reasoned
that there was no conclusive evidence it accomplished its intended purpose
and stimulated capital investment to a degree sufficiently significant to
produce economic growth.338 The Committee professed that the investment
credit merely shifted the timing of equipment purchases that would have
taken place regardless of the credit. 33 9 On October 22, 1986, the Tax
Reform Act put an end to the controversial history of the investment credit
along with the experimentation in cyclical fiscal action.340
V. CONCLUSION
History teaches us many important lessons. Here the message is loud
and clear. Cyclical fiscal activism is a pill that is difficult to swallow. The
investment credit had a more onerous calling than the typical tax credit. It
represented far-reaching measures to influence the economic market in a
countercyclical manner. The investment credit was part of a complex
experiment in New Economics theory and market regulation. It represented
the transformation of the tax system from a revenue-raising device to an
economic stimulus instrument. The decreasing confidence in the efficiency
of fiscal management of capital investments and its intricate nature led to
the repeal of the investment credit while the immediate expensing rule was
expanded and perpetuated to this day.
History also demonstrates that immediate expensing's path
dependency was perpetuated due to its title, which contained the proverbial
"small business" and its rather simple nature.34 1 These topics continue to
receive congressional attention today. 342 Regulatory compliance costs,
credit problems, and the federal tax burden of small businesses will remain
3 Yorio, supra note 334, at 416; see also S. REP. No. 99-313, at 33, 39 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-
426, at 84, 145 (1985).
339 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplicity, Equity, and Efficiency, 4
AKRON TAx J. 69, 80 (1987) ("These features are the components of many popular tax shelters. While
individually advantageous, they have produced serious problems in the allocation of capital stock.").
` 26 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1988). Technically, these sections were "amended" in 1986, but defacto
were repealed.
" In 1978, the House admitted in a report on depreciation that immediate expensing was enacted
to provide a special incentive for small businesses. See H. REP. No. 95-1445, at 109 (1978) ("The
committee believes that the additional first-year depreciation provision should be liberalized to provide
a greater incentive for small businesses to invest in depreciable machinery and equipment."). The
Senate report on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reiterated the fact that under present law
there are no special provisions specifically applicable to depreciation of assets by small business. S.
REP. No. 97-144, at 44 (1981); see also Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 55 (discussing and providing an
example of the path dependency of small business tax preferences).
342 E.g., American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313; Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504; Tax Relief Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296; American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
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on the political agenda.34 3 Declarations of politicians promising benefits to
the "little guy" to win the public vote will persist and reinforce this
route. 3" Over the years, the House and Senate Select Small Business
Committees and the Small Business Administration have managed to
propose and engrave small business legal preferences, reflecting a heavy
investment by our legal system.345
The anomaly of the immediate expensing and investment credit
narratives is relevant today. Congress is currently debating several
proposals put forth to reform the business tax regime. Among those
proposals are suggestions to increase the immediate expensing limits and
make them permanent346 and to allow the entire cost of any qualified
investments to be immediately deductible.3 47 On the other hand, over the
" See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors of Entrepreneurship, 55 B.C. L. REV. 719, 771-72
(2014) (discussing the value of acknowledging the importance of livelihood businesses in political
discourse); Eyal-Cohen, supra note 27, at 1045-46, 1087 (arguing that small business favoritism is
inconsistent, over-inclusive, and creates data distortion); Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Should Small
Businesses Be Tax-Favored?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 387, 393 (1995) (concluding that for various reasons
small business should not systematically be favored); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The
Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1998)
(providing a list of negative externalities small business creates in society); Eric Toder, Does the
Federal Income Tax Favor Small Business?, 2007 NAT'L TAX AssoC. PROC. 159, 159,
http://www.ntanet.org/images/stories/pdf/proceedings/07/018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLF8-7ERB]
(arguing against the Internal Revenue Code favoring firms of different sizes); Wilson, supra note 65, at
68 (estimating that the cost of annually subsidizing small business is $5 billion).
* For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury Department's Office of Tax
Analysis estimated the federal revenue cost of all the small business tax preferences to exceed $11
billion in fiscal year 2013. See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32254, SMALL
BuSINESS TAX BENEFITS: CURRENT LAW AND MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THEM (2013);
see also ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RESEACH SERV., R40985, SMALL BUSINESS: ACCESS TO CAPITAL
AND JOB CREATION (2015) (recommending the federal government take certain actions to enhance
small business access to capital).
345 See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 343, at 387 (asserting that constructing a case of systematic
favoritism of small businesses is quite difficult, especially through the tax code); see also Wilson,
supra note 65, at 68 (estimating the cost of annually subsidizing small business to be $5 billion); supra
Part Ill (describing Congress's history with small businesses).
"6 See J. CoMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS ON PRESENT LAW AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM SUBMITTED TO THE TAX REFORM
WORKING GROUPS 551 (Comm. Print 2013), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func-startdown
&id-4517 [https://perma.cc/3K9N-SJ54] ("Support expanding the cash method of accounting such that
the gross receipts test would be increased from $5 million to $10 million . . . .").
3 PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM, supra note 30, at 7, 9; see also GARY
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, SMALL BUSINESS EXPENSING ALLOWANCE: CURRENT
LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS, AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS (2011),
http://biblio.pennyhill.com/small-business-expensing-allowance-current-law-legislative-proposals-in-th
e-I 12th-congress-and-economic-effects/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160427214031/http://biblio.
pennyhill.com/small-business-expensing-allowance-current-law-legislative-proposals-in-the- 12th-con
gress-and-economic-effects/]. President Obama proposed to allow businesses of all sizes to expense all
qualifying capital expenditure with 100% bonus depreciation.
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years there has been little empirical analysis of the efficacy of immediate
expensing in spurring new investments. 34 8
The merits of investment tax incentives continue to be debated.3 49
Economist E. Cary Brown has long demonstrated that if we allow
taxpayers to accelerate the recovery of their capital investments, their
effective tax rates on income from those investments will be zero if they
have sufficient income from other sources to absorb the deduction.5 o
Scholars today echo the Brown theorem that the theoretical equivalence of
these incentives, under certain assumptions, is exempting investments from
tax altogether.35 1 They argued that expensing has the effect of making the
government a partner in taxpayers' investments 3 52 and change the balance
between supply of, and demand for, investment projects.1 3  The
Congressional Research Service recently stated that capital investment
incentives have the potential to restrain economic growth. It thus
encouraged a greater flow of capital into investments that may produce
lower returns than investments not favored by these incentives.3 54
This Article hopes to instigate further discussions on the effectiveness
of historically perpetuated tax investment incentives in achieving their
" A recent study on the effectiveness of investment tax incentives in spurring investments
remains inconclusive. See GUENTHER, supra note 12 (concluding that available evidence indicates that
the expensing allowances probably have had no more than a minor effect on business investment).
3 See, e.g., Thomas Gryta, AT&T, Verizon Tax Breaks Fail to Produce Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
11, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-verizon-tax-breaks-fail-to-produce-jobs-1418345589 [http:/
/web.archive.org/web/20160210002331/http://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-verizon-tax-breaks-fail-to-
produce-jobs- 1418345589] ("With Congress poised to extend a raft of tax breaks, consider this: One
such break has helped AT&T and Verizon slash their recent tax bills by billions of dollars without
leading to the intended increase in investment or jobs.").
" E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSON 300 (1948).
"' Id; see also SETO, supra note 37, at 265; Shaviro, supra note 14, at 15 ("[W]hen the tax
system simultaneously favors returns from business investment and permits interest expense
deductions, taxpayers are encouraged to engage in tax arbitrage transactions, pairing tax-favored
returns against fully deductible interest, that either may be shams, or else may be very poor investments
that lose money before tax." (footnote omitted)).
352 SETO, supra note 37, at 265. Similarly, Professor Johnson argued that investment incentives
allow for the cost of the capital investment to go untaxed. This ability to make or continue investments
with pretax "soft money" is an extraordinary privilege. See Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing
Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1020 ("Soft money investing is inconsistent with
taxing the income from an investment."); see also Auerbach, supra note 24, at 1346-48 (demonstrating
in tables 5 and 6 that the present value of accelerated cost recovery system deductions, plus the
investment credit on a $1 investment, was greater than $1, producing a negative effective tax rate).
.. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1905, 1938 (1987) ("[C]ritics of certain capital recovery
rules have argued that such rules distort the balance of investment in short-lived as opposed to long-
lived assets ..... (citing Auerbach, supra note 24, at 1346-49)); Calvin H. Johnson, Depreciation
Policy During Carnival: The New 50 Percent Bonus Depreciation, 100 TAX NOTES 713, 714 (2003)
("The prevailing interest rate measures the price of capital, as determined by the battle between the
supply of capital from savings and the demand for capital from investment projects.").
3 GUENTHER, supra note 347, at 27-28.
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intended purpose. Wilbur Mills strongly contested the use of the tax system
to affect investment behavior without proper accountability.355 As time
passes, he argued, it is essential that measures be tested against their
intended goals. 35 6 Stanley Surrey echoed this notion in his proposal to
display and reassess each year the magnitude of the tax expenditure
budget.35 7 It is time we reexamined the equitability and desirability of the
abundance of tax incentives in the Code. Future studies should evaluate
their effectiveness as economic catalyst, compared to other direct
alternatives.
. See Wilbur D. Mills, Some Dimensions of Tax Reform, 23 ARK. L. REv. 159, 161 (1969)
("[T]ax provisions adopted in the past to serve specific needs or purposes [must] be reviewed
periodically to determine their propriety and usefulness in today's world."); see also JULIAN E.
ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE STATE, 1945-1975, at 15, 180
(1998) (portraying Mills as the most influential chair of the House Ways and Means Committee); Kirk
J. Stark, The Elusive Transition to a Tax Transition Policy, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 145, 166 (1996)
(describing Mills as the powerful chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, the strongest
committee in Congress).
" Mills, supra note 355, at 161 ("They must be tested against the criteria and standards of
present-day society and current concepts and practices in the commercial and financial arenas.").
357 See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES (1973); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
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APPENDIX
FIGURE I
Historical Maximum Allowance and Investment
Expensing from 1958 to 2014
Limitations of Immediate
Year Maximum Expensing Maximum Cost ofNewAllowance Equipment
1958-1981 20% $10,000
1982 $5,000 ---
1983 $5,000 --
1984 $7,500 ---
1985 $5,000 ---
1986 $5,000 ---
1987-1992 $10,000 $200,000
1993-1996 $17,500 $200,000
1997 $18,000 $200,000
1998 $18,500 $200,000
1999 $19,000 $200,000
2000 $20,000 $200,000
2001-2002 $24,000 $200,000
2003 $100,000 $400,000
2004 $102,000 $410,000
2005 $105,000 $420,000
2006 $108,000 $430,000
2007 $125,000 $500,000
2008-2009 $250,000 $800,000
2010-2014 $500,000 $2,000,000
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FIGURE II
Investment Tax Credit 1962-1986
Year I Rate
" Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, § 1, 81 Stat. 57, 57 (repealing suspension of credit for
property purchased after March 9, 1967); Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1508, 1509.359 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 703, 83 Stat. 487, 660-67.
36 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 101, 85 Stat. 497, 498-99.
361 Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301, 89 Stat. 26, 36; Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 801, 90 Stat. 1520, 1580-81 (describing Congress's extension of the credit
for four more years).
362 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2166.
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
Repealed
7%
7%
7%
7%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Revealed
Suspended October 10, 1966-
March 9, 1967358
Effective April 18, 1969359
Reinstated June 23, 1971360
Effective January 21, 1975361
Effective January 1. 1986362
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FIGURE III
Business Expenditures for New Plant and Equipment 1948-1971 (in billions of
dollars)363
90
80
60 ----- ------ --
60
50 .
----------
40 -
30
20
10
0
oTotd .Idlutf
3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1976, at 513 (1976),
http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1976/compendia/statab/97ed/1976-06.pdf [https://perma.c
c/9X2G-XTKB]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1967, at 30
(1967), https://fraser.stiouisfed.org/docs/publications/ei supp/pages/606_1965-1969.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3QXM-Q7T2].
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Business Expenditures for New Plant and
dollars)3 "
Equipment 1970-1976 (in billions of
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FIGURE IV
364 Id
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